Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering by Kang, Michael S.
Boston College Law Review 
Volume 61 Issue 4 Article 4 
4-30-2020 
Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering 
Michael S. Kang 
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, mkang@northwestern.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr 
 Part of the Election Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Legal History Commons, and the 
Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael S. Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, 61 B.C.L. Rev. 1379 (2020), 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol61/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College 
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu. 
  1379 
HYPERPARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
MICHAEL S. KANG 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1380 
I. THE HISTORY OF GERRYMANDERING .................................................................................... 1387 
A. The Hyperpartisan Past: Gerrymandering During the Nineteenth Century ..................... 1388 
B. Redistricting into the Cold War Era ................................................................................. 1394 
II. THE UNUSUAL BIPARTISANSHIP OF THE COLD WAR ............................................................ 1399 
A. One Person, One Vote and the Beginning of Redistricting Law ....................................... 1400 
B. Partisanship and Party Politics During the Cold War ..................................................... 1404 
C. Early Redistricting Law During the Cold War ................................................................. 1411 
III. MODERN HYPERPARTISANSHIP AND REDISTRICTING .......................................................... 1416 
A. The New Hyperpartisanship ............................................................................................. 1416 
B. Modern Gerrymandering ................................................................................................. 1421 
IV. THE MISMATCHED LAW OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING ................................................ 1426 
A. The Law of Partisan Gerrymandering ............................................................................. 1426 
B. The Cold War Baseline: Mismatched Understandings About Partisanship and 
Gerrymandering ................................................................................................................... 1433 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 1445 
 
  1380 
HYPERPARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
MICHAEL S. KANG* 
Abstract: To modern observers of American politics, our current hyperpartisan 
era appears historically extreme, even bizarrely partisan. The preceding Cold War 
era was far less partisan and ideologically polarized. Spanning roughly from 
World War II through the 1980s, it offers a hopeful model for a better, less parti-
san American politics. However, this historical baseline is badly misleading. Par-
tisanship for most of American history was much more similar to today’s hy-
perpartisanship than the Cold War. And legislative redistricting, for most of 
American history, was just as intensely partisan as today’s hyperpartisan gerry-
mandering. But it was precisely during the Cold War era of partisan peace that 
courts inaugurated election law and began overseeing redistricting. The develop-
ment of redistricting law, and indeed most of election law, therefore occurred dur-
ing the unusual circumstance of historically low partisanship when partisan com-
plications largely receded from judicial attention. As a result, our inherited law of 
redistricting developed by courts during the Cold War era is fundamentally mis-
matched to today’s hyperpartisanship and hyperpartisan gerrymandering. Moored 
to outdated Cold War assumptions, the Supreme Court badly underestimates hy-
perpartisanship and the effectiveness of hyperpartisan gerrymandering. 
INTRODUCTION 
We live in hyperpartisan times. Democrats and Republicans have not been 
more bitterly divided along partisan lines since Reconstruction, nor more ag-
gressively hostile to each other in the history of the two major parties.1 Rank-
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 1 See Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1692–1702 (2015) (summarizing the political science literature and concluding 
that “congressional polarization has been steadily and consistently increasing since the 1980s”); 
Ornstein Says There’s No One Cause for Dysfunctional Government, CLAREMONT COURIER (Mar. 23, 
2013), https://www.claremont-courier.com/articles/opinion/t6911-ornstein [https://perma.cc/V9U5-
SFDR]; Partisan Antipathy: More Intense, More Personal, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.
people-press.org/2019/10/10/partisan-antipathy-more-intense-more-personal/ [https://perma.cc/6J6L-
83MS] [hereinafter Partisan Antipathy] (detailing how increasing shares of partisans view members 
of the opposing party as associated with negative traits like “immorality” and being “unpatriotic”). 
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and-file voters increasingly vote for one party over the other up and down the 
ballot, election after election. Voter animosity against members of the opposing 
party has risen so sharply since the 1980s that prejudice against one’s out-party 
surpasses racial prejudice today.2 Roughly a third of Democratic and Republi-
can voters feel that the opposing party is “so misguided that [it] threaten[s] the 
nation’s well-being,” with roughly half of partisans from both sides reporting 
they feel fearful of the other side.3 Democrats and Republicans in Congress are 
not only antagonistic, but more ideologically polarized than they have been in 
over a century.4 Following a long process of ideological realignment over the 
past fifty years, the major parties have transformed from heterogeneous coali-
tions into internally unified teams with clear ideological views on a wide spec-
trum of issues.5 Democrats and Republicans now represent two cohesive and 
hostile camps—two internally unified teams with clear, contrary positions.6 
And when they engage in legislative redistricting and other forms of election 
law, Democrats and Republicans regularly rig the rules of the game in their 
favor and gouge the other party in outrageous fashion. 
For almost anyone today, our current era seems like a historically ex-
treme, even bizarrely partisan age.7 By comparison, the preceding era of mid-
twentieth-century America was far less partisan and far less ideologically po-
larized.8 The major parties cooperated on national policy during the Cold War, 
passed landmark legislation on a bipartisan basis, and regularly bridged parti-
san rivalry across ideological and regional lines. Voters during this era were 
startlingly nonpartisan by today’s standards. Many split their tickets to back 
different parties’ candidates, changed their votes from one election to another, 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence 
on Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 690 (2015); see also Patrick R. Miller & Pamela 
Johnston Conover, Red and Blue States of Mind: Partisan Hostility and Voting in the United States, 
68 POL. RES. Q. 225, 235–37 (2015). 
 3 Nolan D. McCaskill, Pew Study: Partisan Divide Widest in 25 Years, POLITICO (June 22, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/partisan-divide-pew-study-224650 [https://perma.cc/5KWJ-
YA74]. 
 4 See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democ-
racy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 276–77 (2011). 
 5 See, e.g., Stefan Krasa & Mattias Polborn, Policy Divergence and Voter Polarization in a Struc-
tural Model of Elections, 57 J.L. & ECON. 31, 48–52 (2014); Pildes, supra note 4, at 277. 
 6 See infra notes 230–295 and accompanying text. 
 7 See Partisan Antipathy, supra note 1 (detailing how “[m]ajorities of Americans describe both 
parties as ‘too extreme’”). 
 8 By “partisan” and “partisanship,” I refer to the tendency of party identifiers to associate strongly 
with their party and vote or otherwise align politically along party lines. “Partisan animus” refers to 
affective distaste for the other major party, which tends to reinforce partisanship. Finally, “polariza-
tion” refers to increased distance between the ideological positions of the major parties, as measured 
by various methods. Hyperpartisanship is a magnified form of partisanship, and as I explain, modern 
partisan animus and polarization both contribute to and are exaggerated by hyperpartisanship. 
1382 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1379 
and regarded both major parties favorably. Politicians too were remarkably 
fluid in their partisan and ideological allegiances. They regularly bucked their 
parties and assumed moderate positions at odds with their party leadership. 
Congressional polarization, as measured by political scientists, fell to its mod-
ern lows. For today’s critics of modern hyperpartisanship, this earlier era of 
bipartisanship, spanning roughly from World War II through the 1980s, offers a 
hopeful model for a better, less partisan American politics.9 
This Cold War baseline is understandably salient but badly misleading. 
The bipartisanship of the Cold War, not today’s hyperpartisanship, is the dra-
matic outlier in American history. Congressional polarization for most of 
American history was comparable to today’s levels of hyperpartisanship, and 
voters were nearly as loyal to their parties as they are now.10 Voters rarely split 
their tickets, and their partisan identification likewise stayed consistent from 
election to election. In Congress, similarly, more than a hundred years of strik-
ing polarization preceded the Cold War window of partisan peace in the mid-
twentieth century. America in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was as 
split along partisan lines as it is today in the twenty-first century.11 As political 
scientist Marc Hetherington summarizes, “[I]f one views the entire history of 
the nation rather than just the most recent sixty years, partisan polarization ap-
pears to be more the rule than the exception.”12 It is no surprise, then, that the 
process of legislative redistricting, for most of American history, was just as 
intensely partisan as the rest of American politics. 
This Article introduces this history of redistricting to the legal scholar-
ship. Although largely forgotten today, it is a remarkably relevant tale of ex-
treme gerrymandering featuring as egregious partisanship as today’s hyperpar-
tisan times.13 Understanding this history reveals that it is actually today’s hy-
perpartisanship, and hyperpartisan gerrymandering, that are closer to the his-
                                                                                                                           
 9 See, e.g., David S. Broder, Opinion, President Shouldn’t Give Up on Bipartisanship, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2009), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/president-obama-shouldnt-give-up-on-
bipartisanship/ [https://perma.cc/Z8VM-3UKN] (urging President Obama to engage Republicans on 
Obamacare and citing Cold War examples of the Marshall Plan and Civil Rights Act as models of 
bipartisanship); Pietro S. Nivola, Partisanship in Perspective, NAT’L AFF., Fall 2010, at 91, 93 (citing 
in the same vein Medicare and the civil rights bills of the 1960s). 
 10 See Hahrie Han & David Brady, A Delayed Return to Historical Norms: Congressional Party 
Polarization After the Second World War, 37 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 505, 512–16, 531 (2007) [hereinafter 
Han & Brady, A Delayed Return]; see also Kevin Baker, The Myth of Normal America, NEW REPUB-
LIC (Feb. 15, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/146915/american-politics-has-never-been-normal 
[https://perma.cc/QT4H-SFMN] (“The way democracy is conducted today may have hit a new low in 
the lifetime of most Americans—but not in the life of the republic. The United States has been here 
before.”). 
 11 Marc J. Hetherington, Putting Polarization in Perspective, 39 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 413, 417 
(2009). 
 12 Id. at 419. 
 13 See infra notes 38–137 and accompanying text. 
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torical norm. The bipartisanship of the Cold War era is the exception.14 As po-
litical scientists David Brady and Hahrie Han have documented, congressional 
polarization during the nineteenth and early twentieth century was similar to 
today’s hyperpartisanship but began to decline sharply following World War 
II.15 Indeed, the American Political Science Association’s Committee on Polit-
ical Parties during the 1950s contended that the major parties were, if any-
thing, insufficiently partisan and too ideologically compatible.16 Of course, op-
portunities for bipartisanship were almost uniquely available when the major 
parties overlapped ideologically by significant margins. For the same reason, 
partisan gerrymandering hit historical lows during this period. But this rare 
window of partisan quiescence is virturally singular in American history.17 Al-
most never before nor since the Cold War has partisanship dipped to these unu-
sual lows. 
It was during this era of partisan peace that courts initiated election law 
and began overseeing the redistricting process. The Supreme Court’s introduc-
tion of the one person, one vote doctrine, starting with Baker v. Carr in 1962, 
began regular judicial oversight of the political process.18 The one person, one 
vote cases, though, assumed no partisan dimension to its requirement of equi-
populosity, nor did the political parties believe one person, one vote would 
have a partisan skew when applied nationwide.19 At the time, regional and ra-
cial concerns dominated over partisan interests, which were in an unusual 
abeyance during the era. The same would be true for the Court’s subsequent 
development through the 1980s of vote dilution law, other Voting Rights Act 
questions, and eventually constitutional claims of partisan gerrymandering. 
Thus, the development of redistricting law, and indeed most of election law, 
occurred during an era of historically low partisanship where partisan concerns 
largely receded from judicial attention. 
But by the 1990s, Cold War bipartisanship gave way to what metastasized 
into today’s unrelenting hyperpartisanship. The hyperpartisanship from most of 
American history returned with a vengeance following the Civil Rights Move-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra notes 42–134 and accompanying text. 
 15 Han & Brady, A Delayed Return, supra note 10, at 512–16, 531; see also Baker, supra note 10. 
 16 See COMM. ON POL. PARTIES, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N, TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE TWO-
PARTY SYSTEM 1–14 (1950); Mark Wickham-Jones, This 1950 Political Science Report Keeps Popping 
Up in the News. Here’s the Story Behind It., WASH. POST (July 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/24/this-1950-political-science-report-keeps-popping-up-in-the-
news-heres-the-story-behind-it/ [https://perma.cc/E65A-8LS4]. 
 17 See, e.g., Megan M. Moeller & Sean M. Theriault, Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress, 
in OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (Rick Valelly ed., 2014) (“The congresses after 
the 1964 election and into the 1970s were some of the least polarized in modern history.”). 
 18 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 19 See infra notes 135–167 and accompanying text. 
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ment, as the major parties realigned neatly into homogeneous ideological coa-
litions with scant political crossover by voters or politicians.20 Conservatives, 
once scattered across both parties during the Cold War, now reliably populated 
only the Republican Party, while liberals and progressives abandoned the Re-
publicans and reliably populated only the Democratic Party. The regular ideo-
logical overlap among voters and politicians from the earlier era disappeared, 
along with associated opportunities for bipartisan compromise and moderation. 
What’s more, party animus on both sides mushroomed dramatically and fueled 
a resurgence of partisan gerrymandering over the past thirty years.21 
The payoffs from this understanding of the history of partisanship, gerry-
mandering, and election law are two-fold. First, the law of redistricting devel-
oped by courts during the Cold War era is fundamentally mismatched to to-
day’s hyperpartisanship and the intensity of today’s hyperpartisan gerryman-
dering. The Court’s historic interventions into electoral politics during the 
1960s, and its proverbial dive into the “political thicket” under the one person, 
one vote doctrine, were motivated by then-dominant problems of racial and 
regional discrimination and not at all informed by concerns about excessive 
partisanship that dominate today. The ensuing law of redistricting has thus 
grown up during an era of unusual bipartisanship and has been shaped by 
judges and lawyers of the same experience, when partisanship and gerryman-
dering were the least prevalent in American history. 
As a consequence, the law of gerrymandering is now badly unsuited to 
the intense hyperpartisanship and polarization that has emerged well beyond 
the earlier twentieth-century experience. Justice Scalia once argued that “[y]ou 
cannot really tell until after the election is done how many Republicans and 
how many Democrats there are in each district.”22 Gerrymandering therefore 
confronts what he called a “sea of imponderables.”23 This skepticism about the 
political science reached its obvious apex in Rucho v. Common Cause, when the 
Court finally ruled political gerrymandering to be constitutionally nonjusticia-
ble.24 Chief Justice Roberts echoed Justice Scalia in concluding that adjudication 
of gerrymandering claims “risks basing constitutional holdings on unstable 
ground outside judicial expertise.”25 Separately quoting Justice O’Connor’s be-
lief from 1986, he argued that any supposition about how voters will vote “in-
vites ‘findings’ on matters as to which neither judges nor anyone else can have 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Han & Brady, A Delayed Return, supra note 10, at 512–16. 
 21 See infra Part III.  
 22 Oral Argument at 14:43, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (No. 02-1580), https://www.
oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1580 [https://perma.cc/Y22E-QJ9K]. 
 23 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 290 (2004). 
 24 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019). 
 25 Id. at 2503–04. 
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any confidence.”26 As he explained it, voters choose how to vote election by 
election, based on the issues, tone of campaigns, national events, and local is-
sues, rather than more predictably based on partisanship, such that many voters 
split their tickets or switch parties from year to year.27 
If this was ever quite true, today’s levels of hyperpartisanship ensure that 
it is far less true than it has been for generations, and certainly considerably 
less true than during the Cold War. Modern voting is eminently more predicta-
ble based purely on partisanship, and it has allowed gerrymandering to become 
more aggressive, precise, and durable over time. Redistricting law now needs a 
basic reorientation to these realities of hyperpartisanship, which has returned 
as the defining interest in American politics and election law. 
Second, today’s hyperpartisanship, and today’s breed of hyperpartisan ger-
rymandering, are not going away any time soon.28 Hyperpartisanship appears 
the normal state of American politics, and just as importantly, the pernicious 
practices of partisan gerrymandering are nothing new in terms of partisan in-
tensity and actually quite familiar over the longer run of American history. Nei-
ther hyperpartisanship nor today’s gerrymandering practices are simply a unique 
symptom of social media, campaign finance, a declining local press, or lack of 
social interaction among party leaders, among the many contributing causes al-
leged by critics of modern politics.29 Instead, today’s hyperpartisanship and 
hyperpartisan gerrymandering are likely to be enduring features of American 
politics that courts regulating the political process must assume as regular and 
permanent conditions. 
Partisanship is not nearly as fluid or unstable as courts seem to imagine, 
which means gerrymandering is far more effective and durable today than it 
has ever been. This uncontroversial conclusion is deeply substantiated by so-
phisticated social science, even if Chief Justice Roberts has breezily tried to 
dismiss this empirical consensus as “sociological gobbledygook.”30 As Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Id. at 2502 (quoting Bandemer v. Davis, 478 U.S. 109, 160 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 27 Id. at 2503. 
 28 See McCaskill, supra note 3.  
 29 See, e.g., Joshua P. Darr et al., When Newspapers Close, Voters Become More Partisan, THE 
CONVERSATION (Feb. 11, 2019), https://theconversation.com/when-newspapers-close-voters-become-
more-partisan-108416 [https://perma.cc/93XA-AF5A]; Joe Lieberman, Opinion, Social Media Is 
Distorting What Politicians Believe Is Real, TIME (May 16, 2018), https://time.com/5279157/social-
media-partisanship-problem-solvers-caucus/ [https://perma.cc/E5KG-4U64]; Olga Pierce et al., How 
Dark Money Is Redrawing the Political Map, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 26, 2011), https://www.mother
jones.com/politics/2011/09/corporate-donations-redistricting-influence/ [https://perma.cc/B28Z-S6JH]; 
Bob Stephens, Opinion, Why Have Congressmen Become Overly Partisan?, COLO. SPRINGS BUS. J. 
(Aug. 17, 2007), https://www.csbj.com/2007/08/17/why-have-congressmen-become-overly-partisan/ 
[https://perma.cc/JCT4-NSSK]. 
 30 Oral Argument at 35:21, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161), https://www.
oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1161 [https://perma.cc/9J24-VP6T]. 
1386 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1379 
Kagan in dissent pointed out, the science of gerrymandering today is deeply 
“evidence-based, data-based, statistics-based” in response to Chief Justice 
Roberts’s “unsupported and out-of-date musings about the predictability of the 
American voter.”31 The durability and effectiveness of the gerrymanders in 
Gill v. Whitford and Rucho, based on this science, speak for themselves. Ger-
rymandering’s increasing effectiveness has meant it entails little tradeoff in 
terms of ideological moderation or incumbent safety that perhaps made it more 
“self-limiting” in the past. These unchecked partisan benefits have encouraged 
gerrymanders to grow more aggressive, durable, and popular in the absence of 
meaningful judicial constraint. 
More than a decade ago, constitutional law scholar Samuel Issacharoff 
argued that the emergence of partisan competition in the South since 1965 un-
dercut the continuing imperative for the Voting Rights Act.32 The Voting Rights 
Act was borne of the systematic exclusion of African American voters from 
electoral opportunity under one-party Democratic rule in the Jim Crow South. 
The Voting Rights Act in this context thus “could alter the racial dimension of 
political power, but not the partisan divide.”33 Its passage and enforcement tar-
geted racial deprivations in isolation from partisan considerations, at least ini-
tially. However, as Republicans challenged Democrats in newly competitive 
southern politics, electoral subsidies for African Americans under the Voting 
Rights Act became consequential for partisan control and too tempting for po-
litical actors not to game for partisan advantage. In Issacharoff’s telling, the 
Voting Rights Act, a tool designed entirely for racial redress, became overrun 
by modern partisanship and grew constitutionally vulnerable in significant part 
for this reason.34 
I propose a parallel story for redistricting law more generally, but on a far 
larger scale that spans national, rather than specifically Southern, history and 
politics. Redistricting law was borne of the same era as the Voting Rights Act, 
a time of ahistorical nonpartisanship, and likewise has become mismatched 
with today’s strikingly different party politics. Although the Supreme Court 
has largely adopted Issacharoff’s account of Southern partisanship and the Vot-
ing Rights Act, it has yet to recognize a similar disjunction for national parti-
sanship and redistricting law. 
In Part I, I relate the history of American redistricting from the Founding 
into the Cold War.35 This lost history of redistricting features fierce partisan-
                                                                                                                           
 31 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2519 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 32 Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1714 (2004). 
 33 Id. at 1713. 
 34 See id. at 1713–14. 
 35 See infra notes 39–134 and accompanying text. 
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ship common to American politics before the Cold War and unrestrained ger-
rymandering that is strikingly familiar today. In Part II, I describe the unusual 
bipartisanship of the Cold War era, virtually unique to American history, under 
which the Supreme Court first seriously engaged redistricting and election 
law.36 Early redistricting law, therefore, encountered little complication or con-
cern with partisanship despite its historical salience. 
In Part III, I explain how hyperpartisanship has re-emerged since its Cold 
War eclipse and coincided with the return of the gerrymandering practices 
from the nineteenth century that far exceed anything encountered during the 
Cold War.37 Finally, in Part IV, I argue that the law of partisan gerrymandering 
now has a blind spot to the challenges of modern hyperpartisanship and gerry-
mandering.38 Courts today still imagine the lesser partisanship and milder redis-
tricting practices of the bygone Cold War era during which the justices and judg-
es came of age. As a result, the Supreme Court refused to check the rise of hy-
perpartisan gerrymandering, even as its obvious democratic pathologies escalat-
ed. But, unlike the gerrymandering of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
today’s hyperpartisan gerrymandering has been bolstered by more sophisticated 
practices that have produced unprecedented durability and effectiveness. 
I. THE HISTORY OF GERRYMANDERING 
To paraphrase the late constitutional law scholar Robert G. Dixon, Jr., the 
history of redistricting is a history of partisan gerrymandering.39 Gerrymander-
ing was common and intense from the beginning of the Republic to the twenti-
eth century. It mirrored the intense partisanship of the times and occurred well 
before courts offered any check on gerrymandering practices or judged elec-
tion law at all. As this Part will show, this hyperpartisan history strikingly mir-
rors our modern era of extreme partisanship and gerrymandering in a way that 
represents most of American history but that we have largely forgotten. It was 
only during the Cold War era, coincidentally at the very moment when courts 
began engaging the redistricting process, that hyperpartisanship and gerryman-
dering broke this historical pattern. 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See infra notes 136–229 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 230–295 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 297–413 and accompanying text. 
 39 See ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND 
POLITICS 462 (1968) (quipping that “all [re]districting is ‘gerrymandering’”). 
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A. The Hyperpartisan Past: Gerrymandering During  
the Nineteenth Century 
Gerrymandering during the nineteenth century long preceded the Su-
preme Court’s dive into the “political thicket” with Baker and the one person, 
one vote cases of the 1960s. Redistricting in this earlier era occurred almost 
entirely without legal constraints on gerrymandering.40 There was no basic 
requirement of equipopulosity among districts that is today the bedrock of re-
apportionment and redistricting.41 Nor were there other requirements of equal 
protection law that apply today. There were no Voting Rights Act considera-
tions or constitutional questions of vote dilution. No judicial imposition of 
even conceptual limitations for line drawing along partisan, racial, regional, or 
other bases. As historian Erik J. Engstrom put it, “Without a meddlesome judi-
ciary peering over their shoulders, state legislatures were free to draw districts 
almost however they wanted.”42 
Indeed, state legislatures generally had discretion whether to draw legisla-
tive districts at all. To start, the most basic state legislative decision, at least for 
congressional reapportionment, was whether to elect congressional representa-
tives to the U.S. House by district, or by a statewide, at-large election known at 
the time as election by “general ticket.”43 By “general ticket” election, states 
could eschew individual districts and instead allow voters to cast as many 
votes as the particular state had House seats to fill by election, with all candi-
dates listed on a single slate and recipients of the highest vote totals filling the 
available seats.44 The practical result was that the party receiving a statewide 
majority of votes typically swept up all available House seats.45 By contrast, in 
districted elections, voters would select representatives by geographic dis-
trict—providing a minority party with an opportunity to win districts where its 
voters constituted a local majority, even if it lacked a statewide advantage. 
Compared to districted elections, the general ticket election therefore fa-
vored the majority party.46 According to one count, the general ticket elections 
led to a unified, one-party congressional delegation in 95% of elections held 
from 1800 to 1840; by contrast, districted elections resulted in a unified con-
                                                                                                                           
 40 See id. at 59. 
 41 Id. 
 42 ERIK J. ENGSTROM, PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 194 (2013). 
 43 See id. at 22–28; ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1776–1850, at 105–06 (1987). 
 44 See ZAGARRI, supra note 43, at 105. 
 45 Stephen Calabrese, Multimember District Congressional Elections, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 611, 
628–30 (2000). 
 46 Id. 
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gressional delegation just 28% of the time.47 Thus, in the early days of the Re-
public, the choice between election by general ticket or district was subject to 
obvious political calculation by the majority party in the legislature. Anticipat-
ing the emergence of a Democratic-Republican majority in the New York elec-
tions of 1800, Alexander Hamilton famously but unsuccessfully urged then-
Governor John Jay to switch pre-emptively from the general ticket to districted 
elections for state legislature.48 Hamilton hoped the Federalists might retain a 
minority of seats under districted elections that would be lost under the winner-
take-all, general ticket.49 Federalists in New Jersey had just executed this strata-
gem in their state ahead of the 1798 election to preserve a minority position for 
their party despite an advancing Democratic-Republican electoral majority.50 
Partisan conflict over the choice between general ticket and districted 
elections came to a head with the Apportionment Act of 1842. Intense two-
party competition blossomed with the growth of the Andrew Jackson’s Demo-
cratic Party during the 1820s in opposition to the National Republicans and 
then the Whig Party.51 Although Democrats controlled both houses in every 
Congress but one from 1825 to 1841, two national parties annually competed 
for votes in most states.52 By 1840, the statewide vote margin in congressional 
races between the Whigs and Democrats was less than 10% in roughly 80% of 
the states.53 The 1840 elections, however, were a landslide victory for the 
Whigs, and a catastrophe for the Democrats, who handed over unified control 
of the federal government.54 This Whig majority in the twenty-seventh Con-
gress passed the Apportionment Act of 1842, which required states to elect 
their House representatives “by districts composed of contiguous territory 
equal in number of Representatives to which said State may be entitled, no one 
district electing more than one Representative.”55 
Why did the new Whig congressional majority enact a federal require-
ment of districted elections for the first time? Again, partisan calculation 
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amidst intense partisan competition provides the best explanation.56 Among 
states that elected U.S. House members by general ticket, ones with Democrat-
ic majorities were conservatively expected to net seven new seats from the 
1842 reapportionment while such states with Whig majorities were expected to 
lose three net seats.57 By requiring districted elections under the Act of 1842, 
Whigs prospectively limited Democratic gains from these states in their battle 
for the House.58 What’s more, the Act of 1842 preempted Democratic attempts 
to make new potential gains by switching to the general ticket in their states 
that did not already use it for congressional elections. The Whigs were out-
raged by the political maneuvering before the 1840 elections, when Democrats 
in Alabama switched from districted congressional elections to the general 
ticket and swept all five of the state’s House seats.59 The Whigs may have been 
particularly worried that they would perform poorly in the upcoming presiden-
tial midterm elections and wanted to prevent the Democrats from switching to 
the general ticket elsewhere and replicating their Alabama triumph in other 
states.60 Unsurprisingly, congressional voting on the districting requirement 
reflected this “party question” and the fact “that the Whig party would derive a 
positive advantage” from it.61 Most Whigs voted in favor of the districting re-
quirement, while Democrats were almost unanimously opposed.62 
Even after single-member districts were mandated by law, states still re-
tained legal discretion over whether ever to redistrict.63 The nineteenth century 
pre-dated one person, one vote, so states remained free to retain their existing 
district maps regardless of population shifts and resulting malapportionment 
across districts. There was not yet any constitutional duty to update district 
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lines to maintain one person, one vote.64 As a result, states whose representa-
tion in the U.S. House had not changed following each decennial census had 
little incentive or need to change districts lines unless the majority party in the 
state legislature saw political advantage in doing so. This choice whether to 
redraw district lines, following a new census or otherwise, was itself a political 
calculation by the majority party in the state legislature.65 
States sometimes chose not to redistrict at all if partisan control appeared 
secure.66 Why would the majority party de-stabilize districts that could be ex-
pected to continue delivering majority control? The state of Connecticut elect-
ed not to redraw its congressional districts for seventy years, from 1842 to 
1912.67 The Connecticut Republicans controlled the process and saw no need 
to redraw lines that played to their benefit for the better part of a century, even 
though it produced massive malapportionment. By 1900, Connecticut’s Second 
Congressional District swelled to more than 300,000 residents compared to 
just 130,000 in the Third Congressional District. Democratic voters around 
New Haven were packed into the Second District, diluting Democratic voting 
strength.68 The less populated, rural Third District reliably elected Republican 
congressmen despite far fewer residents by comparison.69 Of course, during 
this period, a state might redistrict if it gained congressional seats following a 
decennial census, finding the need to redraw the lines to fit one or more new 
district into its district map.70 But even new districts did not necessarily obli-
gate states to redraw their maps. After an 1872 amendment to the 1842 re-
quirement of single-member districts, some states chose to maintain their exist-
ing district lines and simply elect all their new representatives at-large.71 
However, where majority control was contested and partisan competition 
greater, states redistricted at a rate that seems almost unimaginable today. Mid-
decade redistricting subsequent to the routine decennial reapportionment was 
jarring to modern sensibilities when states like Texas, Colorado, and Georgia 
recently chose to redraw district lines more than once between censuses.72 
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What modern observers forget today is that mid-decade redistricting during the 
nineteenth century was absolutely commonplace and routinely exercised for 
partisan advantage. Between 1862 and 1896, at least one state in the country 
redistricted its congressional lines during every election year but one in that 
span.73 The state of Ohio by itself redistricted seven times between 1878 and 
1892.74 As control of state government oscillated between major parties under 
intense partisan competition of the era, each partisan takeover led immediately 
to attempts by the new majority to entrench itself as best as it could before the 
next election.75 The result was that Ohio once held six consecutive congres-
sional elections under a new district plan as party control of state government 
continually flip-flopped.76 The hyperpartisan competition of the era drove ger-
rymandering to such extremes. 
None of this hyperpartisanship is surprising to political science. As politi-
cal scientist Walter Dean Burnham described it, the major parties of the nine-
teenth century were “armies drawn up for combat” with “both highly stable 
partisan commitments in the mass electorate and a parallel cultural pattern of 
intense participation extending quite beyond even the very large turnout per-
centages of the era.”77 Given an electorate divided into loyal factions of com-
mitted partisans, the parties focused on militarist mobilization focused on turn-
ing out the maximum number of party faithful to the polls. Turnout for presi-
dential election therefore averaged just under 80% of eligible voters between 
1868 and 1892 with some states like Indiana reaching as high as 83%.78 As 
Burnham explained, “Little was to be gained by attempting to convert a large 
‘floating’ or independent vote, for the good reason that almost none existed.”79 
The “rational party strategy” therefore was overwhelmingly oriented toward 
mobilization, rather than persuasion, because persuasion was limited by “the 
thoroughly mobilized and closely balanced ‘committed’ electorate.”80 To a 
modern observer, Burnham might well have been describing our current state 
of politics, but it fit the equally intense partisanship of the nineteenth century 
just as well. 
Voters of the nineteenth century not only turned out reliably at rates that 
are difficult to imagine today, but they also voted reliably for their party.81 The 
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partisan vote for state legislative races, for governor, and for president regular-
ly correlated at higher than 90%.82 Historical assessments also estimate that 
roughly 90% or more of the electorate voted consistently for the same party in 
consecutive elections.83 In other words, even with exceptionally high turnout by 
modern standards, very few voters during the era split their ballots or switched 
parties between elections. 
Politicians from both parties displayed similar intensity of partisanship as 
their voters. Partisanship was famously high from the Founding onward, with a 
brief lull during the 1810s throughout the Era of Good Feelings. With the birth 
of the first mass Jacksonian party in the 1830s through the rest of the nine-
teenth century, partisanship among party elites was extremely high.84 Historian 
Joanne Freeman explains that during the nineteenth century, “[i]n Congress, 
party politics could be a matter of life and death,” and identifies more than 
seventy violent incidents between congressmen from 1830 to 1860 in an era of 
pitched partisanship.85 Congressional voting was strikingly divided along party 
lines by any available measure. From at least the mid-nineteenth century on-
ward, there was no ideological overlap between elected congressmen and sena-
tors across major parties, with the ideological distance between party medians 
peaking in 1895.86 Political scientists Michael Barber and Nolan McCarty 
demonstrate that partisanship could predict more than 85% of roll-call voting in 
the U.S House from the late nineteenth century into the early twentieth century.87 
Indeed, partisanship dominated national politics for almost all of Ameri-
can history. As a statistical matter, a simple left-right partisan dimension ac-
counts for roughly 94% of congressional Republican voting and 84% of con-
gressional Democratic voting from 1879 to 2004.88 Over the full course of 
American history, the only significant period when partisanship does not ex-
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plain most congressional voting were the brief Era of Good Feelings and, of 
course, the longer Cold War era during the mid-twentieth century, which will 
be discussed later in the next Part.89 Extreme gerrymandering during the nine-
teenth century, therefore, was part and parcel of this earlier hyperpartisan era. 
B. Redistricting into the Cold War Era 
Redistricting slowly began to change around the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury. No student of one person, one vote could miss the fact that many states 
conducted their last statewide redistricting in the first decade of the century 
and then not again until Baker v. Carr. For example, in Colegrove v. Green, the 
Supreme Court considered the legality of Illinois’ congressional district map, 
enacted first in 1901 and left in place for almost half a century until 1948.90 
And in Baker itself, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of Tennessee’s 
state legislative district map, which had been in place for more than sixty years 
since 1901.91 Likewise, in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court considered an Alabama 
state legislative district map that was based on the 1901 census and which had, 
despite a state law that required decennial redistricting, been in place for more 
than fifty years.92 Overall, fewer than half the states redrew their congressional 
districts in a typical decennial redistricting cycle over the six decades from 1902 
until the dawn of one person, one vote in 1962.93 By the end of that stretch, 
states averaged a span of twenty-two years since their last state legislative redis-
tricting.94 Oregon went a half-century without redistricting after 1907.95 Even 
Ohio, which continually redrew its congressional districts through the 1870s and 
1880s, went forty years from 1914 to 1952 without redistricting.96 
The intense gerrymandering of the nineteenth century was gradually giv-
ing way to a long era of partisan calm. As Engstrom put it, “Following the 
landslide elections of the mid-1890s, many state legislatures became the politi-
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cal preserves of a single party.”97 Certainly the Democratic Party dominated 
the South, largely achieved by disenfranchising African-Americans almost 
completely.98 In Louisiana, Democrats occupied every single seat in the state 
legislature from 1900 to 1964 and consequently went from 1912 to 1966 with-
out bothering to redistrict.99 Similarly, Republicans dominated much of the 
North, albeit to a lesser extent than Democratic control in the South. In Michi-
gan, Republicans occupied every seat in the state senate for a decade from 
1918 to 1928, while Republicans in Pennsylvania likewise won 83% of state 
assembly seats from 1910 to 1932.100 
The only short-lived precedent for this early-twentieth-century quiescence 
was the brief Era of Good Feelings following the War of 1812. Partisanship 
reached its lowest historical ebb, with Republicans dominating national poli-
tics and President Monroe re-elected in 1820 with every electoral vote but 
one.101 During this short window, gerrymandering was apparently less fre-
quent, and indeed, several states seriously mulled legal restrictions on gerry-
mandering.102 Just so, the emerging partisan quiescence of the early twentieth 
century begat an era of political scientist V.O. Key’s “silent gerrymander,” or 
gerrymander by omission, where states with safe party majorities saw little 
need or desire to redistrict at all.103 With states divided into regional fiefdoms 
and little national partisan competition, the usual incentives for partisan ger-
rymandering largely disappeared.104 
Instead, during the first half of the twentieth century, a fundamental rural-
urban split influenced national politics and cross-cut rather than coincided with 
major party lines. Immigration and domestic migration helped swell American 
cities during this period such that the 1920 census found that more Americans 
lived in urban areas than rural areas for the first time.105 The Democratic Party, 
in particular, was undergoing a gradual shift from a largely rural constituency 
in the nineteenth century to an increasingly urban one as the twentieth century 
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progressed.106 Racial and religious issues strained national politics and cross-
cut the major parties, such that the Ku Klux Klan, at the height of its populari-
ty, maintained a prominent presence in both the Republican and Democratic 
Parties, wherever each was regionally dominant.107 The major parties, as polit-
ical scientist John Aldrich describes it, “entered a long, slow period of decline” 
from this period through the Cold War.108 This urban-rural split and related 
tensions cross-cut the major parties and diversified both ideologically, sub-
merging the usual pattern of partisan conflict and ideological disagreement that 
preceded.109 
These dynamics explain the extraordinary failure of Congress to reappor-
tion at all during the 1920s. Congress’s usual practice for decades was to de-
cide the size of the House of Representatives and each state’s apportionment of 
the total in light of updated population figures from each new decennial cen-
sus.110 Following the 1920 census, however, Congress stalemated and simply 
failed through the entire decade to reapportion the House, despite many re-
peated attempts.111 The long stalemate over reapportionment had little to do 
with partisanship: Republicans controlled Congress and the White House for 
the entire decade, but nonetheless failed to reapportion by the subsequent cen-
sus. Supporters and opponents of reapportionment were generally divided not 
by partisan interests but the familiar rural-urban split within both parties. Par-
ticularly at the start, most opposition to reapportionment came from rural rep-
resentatives, Republicans and Democrats alike.112 On the first roll call vote, 
23% of Republicans and 20% of Democrats opposed reapportionment, with 
Republicans constituting 62% of the opposition.113 Over the decade on nine 
separate roll call votes for major reapportionment bills, Republicans gradually 
became more supportive and Democrats more opposed, but even by the final 
vote in 1929, Republicans and Democrats represented similar shares of the 
opposition.114 
Far more predictive than partisanship was the rural-urban divide. Almost 
90% of opposition against the final bill came from congressmen representing 
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rural districts, many from states expected to lose seats in the 1920 reappor-
tionment.115 Conversely, congressmen representing urban and metropolitan 
districts, across both parties, were overwhelmingly supportive, with very few 
hailing from states expected to lose seats.116 Ninety-two percent of congress-
men from urban districts and 100% of congressmen from metropolitan districts 
voted in favor of the final reapportionment bill.117 This support, again, split 
both parties. Ninety percent of Democrats and 93% of Republicans representing 
urban districts voted in favor, while congressmen from metro districts voted 
unanimously in favor as well.118 As historian Charles W. Eagles concluded, “ru-
ral representatives made up the overwhelming majority of the congressmen re-
sisting reapportionment,” and “rural opposition seemed unaffected by par-
ty.”119 
The Supreme Court’s reapportionment revolution also began during this 
historically unusual period. The one person, one vote cases were decided in 
post-World War II America when the intense gerrymandering and partisan con-
flict were distant memories from the nineteenth century. The Democrats would 
control the U.S. House of Representatives through a forty-year stretch from 
1954 to 1994. Bob Michel, a Republican congressman and legislative leader 
from the era, regularly pointed out in speeches that no Republican who served 
during his career in the House from 1957 to 1994 had ever been part of the 
majority.120 Indeed, from 1952 to 1982, there were always more than one-and-
a-half times more self-identified Democrats than Republicans in the electorate, 
giving the Democrats an enormous advantage throughout the Cold War.121 As 
one political scientist summarized, “When party control of the House was al-
most a foregone conclusion, as it was for much of the post-World War II era, 
the incentives to aggressively pursue gerrymanders receded.”122 
Redistricting, once a frequent occurrence during the nineteenth century, 
became far less frequent by the 1960s. A 1958 survey of American redistricting 
found that only seventeen states had redistricted their congressional districts 
since the end of World War II. Of those seventeen, fifteen had no choice but to 
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redistrict after gaining or losing seats as a result of population change.123 Mid-
decade gerrymanders, so common during the late nineteenth century, became 
exceptionally rare. For this reason, the average duration between congressional 
redistrictings ballooned from less than a decade in 1890 to twenty-one years by 
1930, and bit higher to twenty-two years by 1960.124 
By the time of the one person, one vote cases in the 1960s, the contempo-
rary experience with redistricting was therefore not the active gerrymandering of 
the nineteenth century (and today), but rather V.O. Key’s silent gerrymander and 
long-term malapportionment. The chronic failure of many states to redistrict af-
ter each decennial census meant malapportionment grew outrageous over a half-
century of desuetude. One 1946 estimate found that twenty-six of forty-one 
states that used single-member districts had malapportioned districts, with a 
maximum population deviation of at least 150%.125 By 1962, the national aver-
age for maximum population deviation had grown to 270,748, such that a state’s 
largest congressional district was twice as large on average as its smallest.126 
In stark contrast to today’s politics, malapportionment across the rural-
urban divide during the mid-twentieth century yielded no consistent partisan 
advantage nationwide. Instead, as contemporary critic Anthony Lewis put it, 
“The direct effect of maldistricting is to tighten the grip of the historically 
dominant party—Republicans in the North, Democrats in the South.”127 Later 
studies similarly found that Republicans may have benefitted outside the South 
from malapportionment in the two decades preceding Baker, but, by 1962, the 
advantage appeared largely offset by a rising Democratic advantage from mal-
apportionment in other states.128 Newsweek thus predicted shortly after Baker 
that the one person, one vote cases would produce gains for Democrats in twenty 
states and Republicans in eleven.129 Democratic Party Chairman John Bailey 
applauded the early one person, one vote decisions as “something the Democrat-
ic Party had long advocated, and fought for, and certainly welcomes.”130 Repub-
lican Party Chairman William Miller answered that the decisions were “in the 
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national interest and in the [Republican] Party’s interest.”131 The intense parti-
sanship and partisan gerrymandering of an earlier era had been relegated, at 
least temporarily, to the dustbin of nineteenth-century history. 
Indeed, subsequent analysis confirmed that the average national partisan 
bias from redistricting immediately before, as well as after the one person, one 
vote decisions, was roughly zero.132 In other words, neither party benefitted 
electorally from malapportionment in the aggregate, nor did either party yield 
a net advantage from the correction of malapportionment after the one person, 
one vote decisions. Republicans benefitted in some states from malapportion-
ment, while Democrats benefitted in others such that the one person, one vote 
doctrine advantaged neither side overall.  
This contemporary history may account for Chief Justice Earl Warren’s 
over-optimism about what one person, one vote would achieve for voter equal-
ity.133 Though the one person, one vote doctrine redressed malapportionment, 
gerrymandering would grow more sophisticated and effective with every sub-
sequent decennial redistricting cycle. The requirement of equal population was 
not enough to thwart the clever manipulation of district lines to systematically 
advantage certain voters and dilute the voting strength of others.134 Perhaps 
Chief Justice Warren could not have anticipated the sort of gerrymandering of 
the next half-century, at least in part because neither he nor others of his gener-
ation had much relevant experience with gerrymandering, as opposed to simple 
malapportionment. 
II. THE UNUSUAL BIPARTISANSHIP OF THE COLD WAR 
The Supreme Court’s intervention into election law and redistricting oc-
curred at an unusual low point for partisanship, polarization, and gerrymander-
ing in American history. Although partisanship was the defining axis for Amer-
ican politics for most of the nation’s history, the Court’s early redistricting de-
cisions during the era were aimed at the racial and regional inequalities result-
ing from the era’s malapportionment—unsurprising, given the relative nonpar-
tisanship. As a result, the resulting law of redistricting simply overlooked the 
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pernicious threat to the democratic process that partisanship potentially posed. 
Today’s redistricting law has inherited this blind spot to the historically charac-
teristic forms of American partisanship and gerrymandering even after they 
emerged again from their Cold War eclipse. 
A. One Person, One Vote and the Beginning of Redistricting Law 
Modern judicial oversight of the political process began with Baker v. 
Carr in 1962. Before Baker, courts almost entirely abstained under the politi-
cal question doctrine in redistricting cases that might draw the judicial branch 
into the “political thicket.”135 Famously, in Colegrove v. Green, Justice Frank-
furter warned that redistricting was “beyond [the Court’s] competence” be-
cause the matter was “of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for 
judicial determination.”136 Justice Frankfurter worried that addressing the mal-
apportionment of Illinois’s congressional districts in that case would “bring 
courts into immediate and active relations with party contests” and announced 
that “[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket.”137 Heeding this caution, 
courts refused jurisdiction in redistricting cases and routinely declared them 
nonjusticiable under this political question doctrine.138 
By 1962, almost twenty years later, the Court confronted overwhelming 
malapportionment in a series of cases that eventually convinced the justices to 
permit courts to intervene under the Equal Protection Clause. In Baker, the 
Court considered a challenge to Tennessee’s state legislative districts, which 
had not been redrawn for six decades.139 Justice Brennan’s opinion in Baker 
first redefined the political question doctrine spelled out earlier by Frankfurter 
in Colegrove. Justice Brennan rejected the notion that reapportionment neces-
sarily presented a political question and was nonjusticiable per se.140 He ex-
plained instead that the political question doctrine applied when a question is 
textually committed to a political branch of government, besides the judiciary, 
or when there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
judicial determination.141 Reapportionment, or in this case malapportionment, 
hardly fell under these categories. 
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Tennessee’s malapportionment instead presented a simple case of equal 
protection. The state legislature discriminated against voters in heavily popu-
lated areas to the advantage of voters in less populated rural ones by refusing 
to reapportion for sixty years. The result was that citizens from districts which 
had grown in population in the interim had less voting power and representa-
tion than citizens from less populated districts, the smallest of which had twen-
ty-three times fewer residents than the largest district. The fact that this claim 
implicated the “allocation of political power within a State,” Brennan rea-
soned, did not render the case a nonjusticiable political question.142 
Partisan considerations were not mentioned at all in the early one person, 
one vote cases. In Baker, Tennessee’s apportionment scheme favored small 
counties over large ones and rural counties over urban ones.143 The state’s mal-
apportionment resulted in a minority population of 37% electing twenty of 
thirty-three state Senate seats, and a minority of 40% electing sixty-three of 
ninety-nine House seats.144 This ensured that a rural minority would comforta-
bly control a legislative majority. As the federal government’s brief framed the 
case, the state violated equal protection in its deliberate “underrepresentation 
of urban voters” that resulted in the “discrimination by the State legislature 
against urban areas in the State’s exercise of its governmental powers.”145 
Despite the enormous political stakes in the balance, this was not a ques-
tion of partisan control in any event. Democrats were firmly in majority con-
trol of the Tennessee legislature before Baker and would remain so after it. 
Democrats held a 27–6 advantage in the state Senate and 80–19 advantage in 
the House after the 1960 elections; these party majorities would be largely un-
changed in the elections following Baker.146 Nor, apparently, did the justices 
consider the partisan consequences to be important enough even for mention in 
their conference deliberations.147 If anything, the justices recognized the sub 
rosa racial implications of newly empowering urban areas in much of the 
country, and especially the American South. Justice Tom Clark, for instance, 
argued in conference, according to Justice Brennan, that “what really was at 
stake here was, at least in the South, the whites’ control of the power struc-
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ture.”148 And Chief Justice Warren went to his grave believing that the Civil 
Rights Movement might not have been necessary if the Court had addressed 
malapportionment earlier for the same reasons.149 In any event, these regional 
and racial considerations dominated judicial and political reasoning about one 
person, one vote. Partisan considerations were not prominent. 
This point was even clearer in Reynolds v. Sims, a decision handed down 
two years after Baker.150 At the time, Alabama was entirely a one-party state in 
which every elected state and federal official was a Democrat. Alabama, like 
Tennessee, had not redistricted since 1901 in a longstanding political arrange-
ment between so-called Black Belt politicians from underpopulated rural areas 
and the Big Mules, industrial leaders from the densely populated, urban north. 
Big Mules consented to the malapportionment that enabled Black Belt politi-
cians to continue controlling state government, provided they delivered anti-
union legislation and low taxes for Big Mule business interests.151 As a result, 
there were absolutely no partisan stakes involved in Reynolds, at least in the 
immediate term. Every seat in both houses of the Alabama state legislature was 
held by a Democrat both before and after Reynolds.152 Indeed, in the Court’s 
view, the case was entirely about the “rural strangle hold” on state government 
made possible only through the gross underrepresentation of urban areas in the 
industrialized north.153 The Court concluded there was no ground for a voter 
having superior voting power “merely because he lives in a rural area or be-
cause he lives in the smallest rural county[.]”154 
To be sure, application of the one person, one vote doctrine had profound 
implications for American politics. For one thing, just as contemplated, judicial 
enforcement of equal population across districts effectuated a massive shift in 
political power from rural areas to densely populated urban centers in every 
state.155 Michigan, for instance, was the first state to reapportion under one 
person, one vote. Only fifteen incumbents out of the thirty-eight-member state 
senate actually retained their seats in the next election, with fourteen incum-
bents choosing to retire rather than run for re-election at all.156 In states like 
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Michigan, power and legislative control shifted suddenly to urban constituen-
cies, which were no longer forced to subsidize rural ones as they long had.157 
But as explained above, the net partisan effect of one person, one vote across 
the country was essentially zero. Malapportionment benefitted the Republicans 
in some states and Democrats in other states. Where the one person, one vote 
doctrine boosted Democrats in certain states like Michigan, it hurt them in oth-
er states like Oklahoma, such that partisan advantage cancelled out nation-
wide.158 In still other states, namely the one-party Dixiecrat South, one person, 
one vote had virtually no immediate partisan consequences, as power merely 
shifted from rural Democrats to urban ones. 
The same was true for vote dilution law as it developed under the Equal 
Protection clause and Voting Rights Act shortly afterward. The Court recog-
nized a vote dilution claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for the first time 
in White v. Regester in 1973.159 The Court upheld a district court’s finding that 
Texas’s use of multimember districts for the state legislature diluted the voting 
strength of African-American and Latino voters in Texas and thus violated 
equal protection.160 The targeted use of multimember districts, as opposed to 
single-member districts used elsewhere in the state, tended to cancel out or 
minimize racial minority voting strength.161 This dilutive effect of multimem-
ber districts, when coupled with evidence of racial discrimination and an ab-
sence of political success for minorities, required the use of single-member 
districts, what became known as majority-minority districts, to allow minori-
ties to effectively participate in the political process.162 
Just as in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court focused entirely on discrimination 
unrelated to partisan considerations. Texas, like Alabama during the 1960s, 
was basically a one-party Democratic state.163 The dilution of African-
American and Latino votes constituted unlawful racial discrimination, but it 
had no partisan consequences at the time. As law professor Nicholas Stepha-
nopoulos points out, the dilution remedy after White was the creation of twen-
ty-nine single-member districts to accommodate African-American and Latino 
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voting interests.164 The remedy dramatically increased minority representation, 
just as intended, but it made virtually no difference in terms of the partisan 
balance of power. Democrats, in fact, slightly increased their state house ma-
jority from 133–17 to 135–15.165 Texas continued on, for the time being, as a 
one-party state. Indeed, beyond the state of Texas, the first two decades of vote 
dilution made little difference for the partisan balance of power in southern 
states.166 Although state house seats controlled by African Americans quadru-
pled from 1970 to 1990, in important part because of judicial intervention un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment, the share of state house seats held by Demo-
crats never fell below 70%.167 
B. Partisanship and Party Politics During the Cold War 
Why were party politics and partisan considerations so absent from the 
Court’s redistricting jurisprudence through the Court’s first quarter-century? 
Today, by contrast, partisanship and partisan advantage predominate over con-
sideration of almost any election law question.168 Certainly questions of redis-
tricting today are invariably viewed through the prism of partisan self-interest 
and partisan consequences. But the Cold War era, during which the Court initi-
ated election law, presented a unique historical break from the normal hy-
perpartisanship that preceded and followed the period. As a result, the Court’s 
early engagement with redistricting occurred at a low point in partisanship and 
party polarization, during which partisan considerations and partisan balance of 
power receded to the background in comparison to the rest of American history. 
Voter partisanship during the period was historically low by almost any 
measure. Political scientists Norman Nie, Sid Verba, and John Petrocik fa-
mously summarized in 1976 that “the most dramatic political change in the 
American public over the past two decades has been the decline of partisan-
ship.”169 The number of Americans identifying as independent, rather than af-
filiated with a major party, increased during this era, while identification with 
the Republicans or Democrats decreased, and especially so for “strong” identi-
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fication with either party.170 In addition, partisanship was unusually unpredic-
tive for voting even for partisan identifiers during this time.171 Voters became 
increasingly likely to vote for a different party’s presidential candidate from 
election to election and more likely to split their vote between presidential and 
congressional candidates from different parties.172 As a consequence, the num-
ber of House districts that split their congressional and presidential support had 
been basically zero at the start of the twentieth century but increased steadily 
from 1948 to 1972.173 
An individual voter’s ideology during this era was not reliably predictive 
of party identification or vote choice. In other words, conservative voters were 
not certain to identify more strongly with Republicans than with Democrats, or 
vice versa.174 The average Democrat and average Republican did not differ 
markedly in terms of ideological beliefs. In 1972, they differed by just 0.66 
points on the seven-point ideological scale of the National Election Survey, 
and ideology and partisanship were correlated at just 0.28.175 By way of rough 
illustration, a third of voters voted in presidential and in congressional elec-
tions for the party further away from them on racial issues in 1956.176 About a 
quarter voted in presidential and congressional elections for the party further 
away from them ideologically about the role of government in society.177 
Even more strikingly, politicians were likewise less partisan in their vot-
ing and orientation than perhaps they have ever been in American history. As 
Figure 1 illustrates, the average distance between ideal points for Republicans 
and Democrats in Congress was historically low from the 1930s through the 
1970s, using DW-NOMINATE scores.178 
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Figure 1: Average Distance Between the Parties using DW-NOMINATE Scores 
(Source: Barber & McCarty, supra note 86, at 40.) 
 
This pattern of low polarization was true for both Houses of Congress, 
and particularly true for the Senate. Party-line voting in the U.S. House had 
been quite high in the late nineteenth century, but steadily declined to an un-
precedented low for a three-decade period from 1940 through 1968.179 With 
national partisan pressures at low ebb, local district pressures exerted a histori-
cally outsized influence on politician positioning during this period.180 In other 
words, diverging sharply from the historical norm, politicians were far more 
responsive to district influences relative to national party differences during the 
1940s through the 1970s. Party affiliation simply reflected the traditional lines 
of division among members of Congress less and less as partisan polarization 
fell to these historical lows. For all these reasons, political scientist Frances 
Lee observes that “the Congress of the mid-twentieth century is often seen as 
one characterized by cozy bipartisanship and reduced party polarization.”181 
The minimal polarization of the period produced an unprecedented degree 
of ideological overlap between congressional Republicans and Democrats. As 
Hahrie Han and David Brady have documented, there was virtually no party 
overlap between Republicans and Democrats in Congress before the 1920s, 
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particularly in the House.182 That is, there was almost never a Democrat more 
conservative than the most liberal Republican, or vice versa, never a Republi-
can more liberal than the most conservative Democrat across the spectrum of 
issues. By 1949, however, almost 10% of House Democrats were more con-
servative than the most liberal 10% of House Republicans. And by 1969, 
roughly 20% of Democratic Senators were more conservative than the most 
liberal Republicans and roughly 20% of Republicans were more liberal than 
the most conservative Democrats. In other words, the ideal points for almost 
half the U.S. Senate fell within the ideological spectrum of the opposite party. 
This pattern of overlap for the Senate is illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2: Cross-Partisan Overlap in the U.S. Senate by DW-NOMINATE Scores 
(Source: Han & Brady, A Delayed Return, supra note 10, at 510.) 
 
This degree of partisan overlap may be remembered nostalgically today 
by many as the “normal” circumstances of American politics. Even at the time 
in 1971, journalist David Broder recognized these developments in his book, 
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The Party’s Over, celebrating the decline of partisanship during the Cold 
War.183 As national politics became far more polarized and increasingly grid-
locked, Broder would yearn for the bipartisanship of the mid-twentieth century 
and wax nostalgic about the success of the Marshall Plan, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, and Ronald Reagan’s first budget and tax bill in 1981.184 But these 
bipartisan compromises occurred in a very different political context that 
commentators like Broder may have mistaken for the historical norm.185 It is 
understandable to assume that one’s era reflects the broader historical norm, 
particularly when one’s relevant era stretched for the better part of a century. 
Indeed, there is some evidence that voters of Broder’s generation remained less 
partisan and ideological than successive generations such that modern hy-
perpolarization may have seemed particularly puzzling to them.186 Still, the 
bipartisanship of the mid-twentieth century was indisputably exceptional with-
in the broader historical context of American politics. 
America of this era reflected an unusual four-party system definitively 
described by political scientist James McGregor Burns.187 Although Democrats 
thoroughly dominated national politics during the mid-twentieth century, the 
party split ideologically between conservative southern Democrats and more 
progressive northern Democrats, such that conservative Republicans and more 
moderate northeastern Republicans completed a swirling political landscape 
where cross-party deals were common and necessary for national legisla-
tion.188 The most important issue in this context was civil rights. Southern 
Democrats regularly allied across the aisle with conservative Republicans to 
block liberal legislation to redress racial discrimination.189 This cross-party 
alliance on race complicated any simple polarization of national politics be-
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tween conservatives and liberals that had characterized American history in 
various guises until the mid-twentieth century. This intense polarization would 
again return once partisan loyalties realigned with policy preferences on civil 
rights and race in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement.190 
The cross-cutting influence of race on partisanship was reinforced during 
the post-World War II period by Cold War politics. Both Democrats and Re-
publicans took a similarly hard line on national defense and foreign policy 
against the Soviet bloc under the banner of American leadership in world af-
fairs.191 The economic prosperity of the post-war era may have softened ideo-
logical tensions between the major parties and encouraged bipartisanship, par-
ticularly on foreign policy.192 Democratic and Republican voters generally 
agreed on national policy against the Soviet Union, and presidents regularly 
appointed members of the opposition party to their foreign policy cabinet and 
staff.193 Bipartisan consensus during the Cold War appears to have unraveled 
around disagreement over the Vietnam War but only later on.194 Elite disillu-
sionment about the war from prominent Democratic elected officials led their 
party leadership away from the Cold War consensus and gradually fractured 
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public support for the war along partisan lines.195 That said, a partisan division 
on foreign policy did not immediately transform party identification on a 
sweeping basis across rank-and-file voters, but like racial issues, it fed partisan 
realignment and the restoration of hyperpartisanship over the longer term. 
C. Early Redistricting Law During the Cold War 
An important byproduct of the unusual bipartisanship of the mid-
twentieth century was that judicial intervention into redistricting disputes was 
hardly as messy as Justice Frankfurter anticipated in Colegrove.196 The stakes 
for one person, one vote were regional and did not provoke partisan conflict. 
Of course, judicial imposition of one person, one vote across the country dis-
rupted the rural stranglehold over government by shifting political power dra-
matically toward urban centers that suddenly received equal per capita repre-
sentation for the first time in decades. The consequences were instant and dra-
matic. Rural legislative majorities in a third of the states promptly vanished as 
a result of one person, one vote.197 And newly constituted state legislatures 
almost immediately eliminated the historical redistribution of state funding 
toward sparsely populated rural counties that had resulted from the rural stran-
glehold over state government.198 But Democrats and Republicans shared the 
gains and losses from the redistribution of power such that courts were right 
not to cast one person, one vote in partisan terms. 
Similarly, early case law under the Voting Rights Act was largely free of 
partisan considerations. The Voting Rights Act targeted the one-party Demo-
cratic South where its remedies were enormously successful in dismantling the 
mechanisms of Jim Crow and enfranchising African Americans.199 However, at 
least in the short term, the Voting Rights Act did not shift power from Demo-
crats to Republicans for a simple reason: there was effectively no Republican 
Party in the South during the era. As a result, the Voting Rights Act implicated 
no immediate partisan interests and would not be used to help or hurt one party 
or the other in the South where it would be applied.200 The absence of signifi-
cant partisan interests therefore simplified concerns about the deep federal in-
tervention into local political affairs that the Voting Rights Act authorized. Of 
course, Lyndon Johnson and other prescient observers of southern politics 
might have anticipated the long-term ramifications of the Act for partisan poli-
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tics, but the eventual emergence of the Republican Party in the South remained 
more than a decade off.201 Thus, at least in the short term, Congress could fo-
cus itself on the racial and federalism concerns raised by the Act without the 
distraction of any partisan calculations it might have raised.  
More importantly, the absence of partisan considerations from the Voting 
Rights Act simplified the doctrinal analysis for courts. The Voting Rights Act’s 
focus on minority voters’ preferred candidates of choice, under Sections 2 and 
5, were uncomplicated by partisan affiliations.202 Their candidates of choice 
constituted a one-party field, at best a choice among Democrats rather than 
between major party nominees. Exclusion from Democratic Party politics was 
therefore, put simply, exclusion from electoral politics. The Court rightly re-
garded African American exclusion from the Democratic Party under these 
circumstances as unconstitutional, from the White Primary Cases through 
White v. Regester in one-party southern jurisdictions like Texas.203 The Court, 
in White, regarded the absence of African American opportunity in the Demo-
cratic Party and Democratic racial campaigning to defeat minority preferred 
candidates as decisive evidence of invidious election practices that cancelled 
out or minimized African-American voting strength.204 The Court did not 
bother to consider actions by or opportunities within the Republican Party be-
cause the local Republican Party during the period, as V.O. Key would put it, 
“scarcely deserve[d] the name of party.”205 
During this period of low partisanship and low partisan competition, it is 
unsurprising that partisan gerrymandering was less pervasive and extreme than 
during the far more partisan era of the nineteenth century. With partisan com-
petition low during the early twentieth century, incentives to gerrymander de-
creased. Indeed, incentives diminished dramatically to redistrict at all, during 
this time before one person, one vote. Ohio had redistricted constantly during 
the late nineteenth century—seven times between 1878 and 1892 alone—in the 
midst of intense partisan competition and swings in majority control.206 But 
during the early twentieth century, unchallenged Republican dominance meant 
that the state did not bother to redistrict at all from 1914 to 1952.207 Remember 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See, e.g., ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS 
IN AMERICA 38 (2015). 
 202 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 2 & 5, 79 Stat. 437 & 439 (codified 
throughout scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.). 
 203 The White Primary Cases were a series of cases in the early- to mid-twentieth century: Terry 
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 
536 (1927).  
 204 White, 412 U.S. at 765–67. 
 205 V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 277 (1949). 
 206 ENGSTROM, supra note 42, at 62. 
 207 Id. at 172. 
2020] Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering 1413 
also that between 1862 and 1896, at least one state redistricted its congression-
al districts in all but a single election year during that span.208 By contrast, 
from 1902 to 1962, no more than half the states bothered to redistrict even fol-
lowing decennial census. For this reason, most of the one person, one vote cas-
es arose in states where redistricting had not occurred since roughly the turn of 
the twentieth century. 
In addition, the severity of gerrymandering, even when it was pursued, al-
so seemed to decrease during the early twentieth century. Stephen Engstrom 
reports that only 52% of redistricting maps before 1900 maintained the parti-
san status quo. Following the turn of the century, though, 65% of maps main-
tained the status quo, evidencing fewer aggressive partisan gerrymanders that 
flipped partisan control.209 Between 1840 and 1900, there were forty-five whole-
sale partisan transitions where one party’s map was replaced by a map drawn 
by the other party, which accounted for 34% of all plans over that stretch.210 
Between 1900 and 1962, there were only sixteen such transitions, accounting for 
just 13% of plans.211 Political scientists Steve Ansolabehere and Maxwell Palmer 
also report measures of partisan bias from gerrymandering based on district 
noncompactness and reach consistent findings about the limited effects of plans 
during the twentieth century.212 Non-compactness remained fairly constant for 
most of the twentieth century until roughly the 1970s. 
It is surprising, then, given the low levels of partisanship during the peri-
od, that the Supreme Court first declared partisan gerrymandering claims justi-
ciable in 1986.213 Gerrymandering was nowhere near the levels of the nine-
teenth century at this time, and courts had never seriously entertained an equal 
protection claim along these lines. Still, gerrymandering was steadily increas-
ing in the aftermath of the one person, one vote revolution. Remember that 
gerrymandering was largely unnecessary before one person, one vote, with 
malapportionment doing the dirty work of entrenching incumbents in office. 
The new requirement of one person, one vote now required incumbents to do 
more than simply leave in place their old district lines decade after decade. 
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Instead, governments now had to revise their districts at least once every dec-
ade to reflect updated population figures from each decennial census. As a 
consequence, to retain their seats with the desired level of security, incumbents 
turned to more aggressive gerrymandering to ensure reelection. The Indiana 
gerrymander in Davis v. Bandemer, for example, enabled Republicans to win 
eighteen of twenty-one state house seats in Marion and Allen Counties despite 
winning just 47% of the vote there.214 
While not nearly as widespread, egregious, or predictable as partisan ger-
rymandering would soon become, partisan gerrymandering by the 1980s had 
worsened—as evidenced by then-notorious partisan gerrymanders, not only in 
Indiana but California, Arizona, and several other states.215 Judicial interven-
tion in Bandemer therefore might have reflected some anxiety about the rebirth 
of gerrymandering that Chief Justice Warren seemed not to have fully antici-
pated out of the one person, one vote decisions. What’s more, though the mag-
nitude of 1980s gerrymandering seems quaint by today’s standards, it might 
have been more alarming at the time to justices whose political expectations 
and sensibilities were established during the partisan quietude and respite from 
gerrymandering of the mid-twentieth century. 
All that said, the timidity of the Court’s intervention against partisan ger-
rymandering in Bandemer certainly reflected its Cold War expectations about 
partisanship and gerrymandering. The seminal Columbia University studies of 
mid-twentieth century introduced the concept of the “cross-pressured” voter to 
modern political science. They identified a cross-pressured voter as someone 
with “opinions or views simultaneously supporting different sides” of an elec-
tion, such that some factors “may influence him toward the Republicans while 
others may operate in favor of the Democrats.”216 Cross-pressured voters were 
more ambivalent, later to make up their mind, and most likely to switch party 
allegiance in a given election than typical partisans.217 The notion of the per-
suadable cross-pressured voter “with a foot in each candidate’s camp” has been 
central to American politics and campaigns at least since then.218 Along these 
lines, political scientists Sunshine Hillygus and Todd Shields contended that 
roughly one-third of the presidential electorate could be classified as persuada-
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ble cross-pressured voters and that the number of “persuadables” in the elec-
torate was larger than the winning margin in ten of fourteen presidential elec-
tions through this era.219 As political scientist Matthew Levendusky summa-
rized, “For fifty years, political scientists—and political pundits—argued that 
campaigns should focus on identifying and converting undecided voters: the 
‘swing’ voters.”220 
Just so, the Bandemer Court crafted a standard for unconstitutional ger-
rymandering that could be violated only when one party had been “essentially 
. . . shut out of the political process” as a whole on a durable basis.221 Under 
this standard, no trial court for almost twenty years ultimately found that a par-
tisan gerrymander shut a party out of the political process. As Daniel Low-
enstein put it, Bandemer required the virtually permanent exclusion of a major-
ity group from the political process as a whole, a standard that was practically 
impossible to meet.222 Why such an extreme standard? The Court observed in 
Bandemer that “Indiana is a swing State” where “[v]oters sometimes prefer 
Democratic candidates, and sometimes Republican.”223 The Court explained 
that Democrats could overcome the Republican gerrymander against them in 
future elections by receiving “an additional few percentage points of the votes 
cast” and were not consigned to “minority status in the Assembly throughout 
the 1980s” as a result.224 Justice O’Connor went further in her concurrence. 
Emphasizing that “voters can—and often do—move from one party to the oth-
er or support candidates from both parties,” she doubted the ability to predict 
voting strength based on partisanship and questioned the returns from gerry-
mandering as “a self-limiting enterprise” over time because voters so vacillat-
ed from party to party.225 
At the time, this faith in the fluidity of partisanship was more justifiable 
and undergirded a standard for partisan gerrymandering that hardly any plain-
tiff could meet for decades. The lone exception only served to underscore this 
faith. In Republican Party of North Carolina v. Hunt, the district court found 
that the state’s system for electing superior court judges unconstitutionally pre-
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cluded Republican electoral success under the Bandemer standard.226 Howev-
er, in an election held five days after the decision, Republican candidates swept 
every superior court judgeship where they ran for office. This reversal led the 
Fourth Circuit to remand for reconsideration.227 Justice Scalia would later in-
voke the Hunt litigation as a “delicious illustration” that partisan affiliation 
“may shift from one election to the next; and even within a given election, not 
all voters follow the party line.”228 Confident in this faith, the Court did noth-
ing to bolster partisan gerrymandering claims when it revisited the question in 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, nearly twenty years after Bandemer.229 
Even by then, as I explain in the next Part, partisanship already had re-
surged, as had partisan gerrymandering. But the cast of partisan gerrymander-
ing law already had been set, as were the justices’ foundational assumptions on 
these basic questions about partisanship. The justices’ assumptions and the re-
districting law that followed from them were grounded in an earlier, less parti-
san era that was rapidly disappearing. 
III. MODERN HYPERPARTISANSHIP AND REDISTRICTING 
By the 1990s, hyperpartisanship re-emerged in American politics. The 
Republican and Democratic Parties underwent an ideological realignment from 
heterogeneous coalitions into cohesive units with clear positions on a wider 
spectrum of issues. Although the re-emergence of hyperpartisanship was star-
tling to contemporary observers, it was familiar to any diligent student of 
American history. The aberrational bipartisanship of the Cold War had ended. 
With the re-emergence of hyperpartisanship came the re-emergence of 
hyperpartisan redistricting. In fact, modern gerrymandering is even more se-
vere than that of the nineteenth century, now aided by computer technology 
and rich new data never before available to re-districters. However the inherit-
ed law of redistricting, created during the Cold War era, is terribly miscalibrat-
ed for the magnitude of hyperpartisan gerrymandering of today.  
A. The New Hyperpartisanship 
The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, during the heart of the Cold 
War period, initiated a gradual process of ideological realignment within the 
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major parties whose full effects were not apparent until the 1990s.230 In short, 
conservative Democrats, mainly in the South, slowly became Republicans, 
while liberal Republicans, mainly in the Northeast, slowly became Democrats, 
such that both parties were more ideologically cohesive and well-sorted by 
political belief than they had been in at least a century. Race, again, was criti-
cal to the story of partisanship. The Democratic Party’s leadership on civil 
rights during the 1960s disaffected Southern Democrats from the party. Over a 
decades-long process of generational replacement and partisan conversion, 
conservatives left the Democratic Party, while liberals left the Republican Par-
ty.231 The result transformed both major parties into ideologically cohesive, 
highly competitive factions at the level of both voters and politicians with vir-
tually none of the ideological overlap that characterized the preceding Cold 
War period.232 
This partisan realignment was part of a comprehensive restoration of hy-
perpartisanship in American politics. The number of voters who identify with 
the major parties grew dramatically from the 1970s onward, while fewer and 
fewer people placed themselves in the middle of the partisan spectrum. Since 
the 1970s, substantially more Americans are identifying as strong Republicans 
or strong Democrats.233 Meanwhile, the number of voters who identify as in-
dependents decreased by half from 1952 to 2004.234 
What’s more, partisan identification has become increasingly predictive 
of voting since the 1970s. Even by 1996, partisanship was already 77% more 
predictive of presidential voting than in 1972 and 60% more predictive of con-
gressional voting.235 Ticket splitting, so common during the 1970s, decreased 
by more than two-thirds by the last decade as voters displayed stronger loyalty 
to their party up and down their ballot, as well as election to election.236 As a 
consequence, only 8% of voters in 2004 reported voting for a different presi-
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dential candidate in 2008 than in 2004, the lowest percentage in successive elec-
tions since the National Election Studies began tracking responses in 1956.237 
Split-party voting between presidential and congressional voting at the 
state level dropped off dramatically since the 1970s as well. In 1976, roughly 
half the states had a split-party Senate delegation. By 2004, only thirteen states 
had one.238 Of the states that had a unified Senate delegation in 1976, just six-
teen of twenty-six actually voted for the same party’s nominee in that year’s 
presidential election.239 By contrast, thirty-one of the thirty-seven states with a 
unified Senate delegation in 2004 also voted for the same party’s presidential 
nominee that year. Over the same period, as Figure 3 illustrates, straight-ticket 
voting on a partisan basis increased dramatically. Republicans today vote con-
sistently for Republicans, and Democrats today vote consistently for Demo-
crats. 
Figure 3: Split-Ticket and Straight-Ticket Voting from 1952 to 2012 
(Source: Alan Abramowitz & Steven W. Webster, Negative Partisanship:  
Why Americans Dislike Parties but Behave Like Rabid Partisans,  
39 ADVANCES POL. PSYCH. 119, 131 (2018)) 
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Consistent with partisan realignment, today’s partisans are also far more 
supportive of their party’s ideological direction and agenda than voters during 
the mid-twentieth century.240 In 1978, only 32% of Republicans described 
themselves as politically conservative as opposed to moderate or liberal. Al-
ready by 1994, the number basically doubled to 63%.241 Similarly, the percent-
age of Democrats who describe themselves as conservative shrank by half over 
the same period. In 1978, 56% of Democrats said they were politically con-
servative but only 28% of Democrats self-identified as conservative by 1994. 
As a result, the correlation between ideology and party identification basically 
doubled, with party identifiers much more attuned to the ideological positions 
of the major parties.242 This correlation is particularly true for party activists, 
but also quite true for rank-and-file voters.243 Indeed, disagreement between 
Democrats and Republicans on salient cultural questions now surpasses disa-
greement between southerners and non-southerners during the 1960s on civil 
rights.244 So it is no surprise that percentages of the public who see important 
differences between the parties and care which party wins the presidency have 
grown dramatically since the 1970s and indeed, reached historical highs for the 
sixty-year history of the National Election Studies.245 
Congress is more polarized today than it has been in more than 125 years 
as measured by DW-NOMINATE scores.246 What is even more striking is that 
today’s polarization emerged from the historically low partisanship of the mid-
twentieth century. The distance between the ideal points of the mean Democrat 
and mean Republican in the House was a historically low 0.51 to 0.62 during 
the late 1950s into the 1980s.247 But from the late 1980s onward, the ideologi-
cal distance between the parties has basically doubled, to 0.91 by 2007, with 
most of the growth occurring over the final decade of that period. In the early 
1970s, House members were clustered in the middle, with 58% within the 
middle third of the DW-NOMINATE distribution. By 2004, only 20% fell 
within the middle.248 Because this process accelerated in years since then, there 
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is virtually no ideological middle in Congress between the party caucuses.249 A 
similar pattern of sharp partisan divergence has been demonstrated among state 
legislators and even among the Justices of the Supreme Court.250 
As a consequence, there is no longer any ideological overlap between 
congressional Republicans and Democrats. Recall that during the 1960s, 
roughly 20% of Republican senators were more liberal than the most conserva-
tive Democrats, and the same percentage of Democratic senators were more 
conservative than the most liberal Republicans.251 This ideological overlap was 
completely gone by the last decade.252 So, it is utterly unsurprising that biparti-
san cooperation has declined in the modern era of hyperpartisanship. The bar-
gaining space across the aisle between Republicans and Democrats has simply 
disappeared.253 
In other words, hyperpartisanship now dominates American politics in a 
way that might have been difficult to imagine during the Cold War. It has been, 
in Richard Pildes’s words, the “defining attribute” of American democracy 
over the last generation.254 It is also no surprise then that the re-emergence of 
hyperpartisanship gave rise to the re-emergence of hyperpartisan gerrymander-
ing during the twenty-first century. 
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B. Modern Gerrymandering 
By every measure, the hyperpartisan intensity of nineteenth-century ger-
rymandering has returned. The magnitude of partisan bias resulting from ger-
rymandering has soared upward since the 1980s, but spiked noticeably in the 
2010 redistricting cycle.255 Although redistricting today is encumbered by far 
more legal restrictions today than it was in the nineteenth century, gerryman-
dering is characterized by similar partisan intentions as that earlier era and 
sharply distinct from the partisan calm that reigned during the Cold War. 
Law professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos and political scientist Eric McGhee 
documented this rise of gerrymandering from 1972 to 2012 in terms of 
McGhee’s efficiency gap measure.256 The efficiency gap tracks the net differ-
ence in “wasted votes” between the major parties for a given district map.257 
Wasted votes are votes cast (i) for a losing candidate or (ii) for a winning can-
didate in excess of the necessary winning margin in her district.258 The differ-
ence in total wasted votes, aggregated across elections, then can be used to 
indicate how many extra seats are gained by the gerrymandering party as a 
result of this efficiency advantage.259 This efficiency gap provides a metric for 
the severity of partisan disadvantage suffered by the gerrymandered out-party. 
By this measure, the average efficiency gap for congressional and state house 
elections has risen since the 1980s and abruptly shot upward after the 2011 
redistricting cycle in time for the 2012 elections.260 The average congressional 
efficiency gap jumped from 1.02 seats from 1972 to 2010, suddenly up to 1.58 
seats in 2012.261 For state house, the average efficiency gap jumped from 
4.94% of seats from 1972 to 2010 to 6.07% in 2012.262 
The absolute number of severe gerrymanders as measured by the efficien-
cy gap has also increased sharply in the most recent redistricting cycle. In the 
1970s, there were only two state congressional district maps with an average 
gap of more than two seats.263 This grew to four plans in each of the next three 
decennial redistricting cycles. However, there were seven maps in 2012 with 
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an average gap of at least two seats, all pro-Republican.264 It’s the same story 
for state house maps. There were just six state house maps in the 1970s with an 
average gap of 8% or more.265 By 2012, there were fourteen state house maps 
with such an average gap, twelve pro-Republican, two pro-Democratic.266 As 
Stephanopoulos and McGhee summarize, it is “clear that the scale and skew of 
today’s gerrymandering are unprecedented in modern history.”267 
The results using a different but also well-established measure of partisan 
gerrymandering, called partisan bias, point to exactly the same conclusions. 
Partisan bias measures the difference in seats each major party would be ex-
pected to win if it earns 50% of the two-party statewide vote.268 For example, 
if Republicans in a given state win 55% of seats with 50% of the vote—and 
Democrats win the remaining 50% of the vote but 45% of seats—then Repub-
licans enjoy a +/- 5% advantage in partisan bias.269 In other words, Republi-
cans would win 10% more seats with the same percentage of the two-party 
vote. In fact, this difference was essentially the partisan bias in favor of Repub-
licans after the 2010-11 redistricting cycle.270 The nearly 10% advantage in 
favor of Republicans was almost three times the level from the previous de-
cennial redistricting in 2002.271 
These increases in partisan bias were the direct result of more aggressive 
gerrymandering. Political scientist Anthony McGann and his co-authors locate 
partisan bias from redistricting almost exclusively in states where one party 
had both opportunity and motivation to gerrymander.272 They find demonstra-
ble partisan bias in the eighteen states where (i) the legislative process was 
responsible for redistricting; (ii) one party had unified control of government; 
and (iii) there was two-party competition in federal elections, modestly defined 
as a margin of 25% or less in the presidential election.273 
Furthermore, McGann and his co-authors find that the partisan bias from 
gerrymandering increased sharply from 2002 to 2012. In nine states already 
gerrymandered in favor of Republicans from the previous redistricting, parti-
san bias increased even further and accounted for almost half the growth in 
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partisan bias toward Republicans in the 2011–12 cycle.274 During this time, 
partisan bias doubled in Alabama, Georgia, and Pennsylvania.275 And partisan 
bias toward the Republicans quadrupled in Missouri from 2002 to 2012.276 In 
other states where Republicans took over government from Democratic con-
trol, partisan bias swung from Democratic advantage in 2002 to a much larger 
Republican advantage in 2012.277 In both North Carolina and Tennessee, for 
instance, the partisan bias was roughly 10% in favor of Democrats in 2002 but 
jumped to 28% in Tennessee and 36% in North Carolina in favor of the Repub-
licans after the 2011–12 redistricting.278 Partisan gerrymandering had been su-
percharged into today’s hyperpartisan gerrymandering. 
Why has gerrymandering accelerated recently? The simple answer is hy-
perpartisanship. Indeed, national party intervention already began ramping up 
with the 2001–02 redistricting cycle. The renewal of hyperpartisanship, with 
control of Congress potentially on the line, motivated the Republican national 
party to push for more aggressive gerrymandering where extra seats could be 
gained.279 In Texas, Republicans won control of state government, and a new 
congressional redistricting map was already put in place following the 2000 
Census. However, Republican national party leaders, including House Speaker 
Tom DeLay and Karl Rove, pressured reluctant state leaders to engage in a 
gerrymandering practice that had not been seen since the days of nineteenth-
century hyperpartisanship: a mid-decade re-redistricting.280 
State leaders initially balked; the Lieutenant Governor of Texas at the 
time, David Dewhurst, described the prospect of redistricting a second time in 
the same decade as unappealing as a “contagious flu.”281 Then-Governor Rick 
Perry dismissed the idea by asking rhetorically: “It’s like, ‘Do you want to go 
run your wind sprints again?’”282 But the 2001–02 redistricting cycle marked a 
new era in gerrymandering. It was the first redistricting cycle under one per-
son, one vote where both parties viewed congressional control as up for 
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grabs.283 State Republicans eventually followed the pattern of their nineteenth-
century counterparts and redistricted their congressional districts again accord-
ing to the national party’s direction.284 A similar series of events occurred for 
mid-decade re-redistricting in Colorado the same year, though that plan was 
struck down under the state constitution.285 Georgia Republicans re-redistricted 
mid-decade but did so only for a few specific vulnerable incumbents, rather 
than redrawing the entire state map, a practice that continued into the follow-
ing decade.286 
To be sure, Republicans are not the only political party to engage in ger-
rymandering. However, specifically for the 2011–12 cycle, Republicans better 
anticipated and seized the crucial advantages from gerrymandering in today’s 
polarized, highly-competitive environment. They famously initiated the Redis-
tricting Majority Project—nicknamed Project REDMAP—to pour unprece-
dented resources and coordination into the 2011–12 redistricting cycle.287 The 
first step was to gear up for the 2010 midterm elections at the state legislative 
level and win control over as many state legislatures in advance of the crucial 
redistricting following the 2010 Census. As GOP political strategist Karl Rove 
predicted at the time, these state races would “determine who redraws congres-
sional district lines after [the 2010] census, a process that could determine 
which party controls upwards of 20 seats and whether many other seats will be 
competitive.”288 After the 2010 elections, Republicans gained almost 700 state 
legislative seats and held majorities in ten of the fifteen states where state leg-
islatures controlled redistricting and were scheduled to gain or lose congres-
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sional seats under reapportionment.289 Republicans had exclusive authority to 
draw districts for 193 House seats, compared to just forty-four for the Demo-
crats.290 The next step was to focus on gerrymandering to the hilt in states 
where Republicans had won control of redistricting, such as North Carolina, 
Wisconsin, and Ohio, to lock in state legislative majorities and the Republican 
House majority.291 
The competitive pressures of this hyperpartisan era fueled the renewed in-
tensity of gerrymandering. Long gone was James McGregor Burns’s sleepy 
four-party system and its regional fiefdoms that persisted into the Cold War. 
By the 2000s, the South was newly competitive between regnant Democrats 
and a rising Republican Party better aligned with conservative southern vot-
ers.292 Although Democrats attempted to hold off the Republican majority with 
gerrymanders of their own throughout the 1990s into the 2000s, Republicans 
quickly replaced them with even more effective gerrymanders upon taking 
power in states like Texas. Because of the one person, one vote doctrine, states 
could no longer go more than a decade without redistricting, but mid-decade 
redistricting, once a regular nineteenth-century practice, was now back again. 
As was the aggressive gerrymandering of that earlier era as well. 
For the upcoming 2021 redistricting cycle, Democrats promise to match 
the Republicans’ organization and investment. Even before the end of the 
Obama presidency, President Obama and former Attorney General Eric Holder 
identified redistricting as a Democratic priority in advance of the 2020 elec-
tions.293 Holder chairs the newly created, well-funded National Democratic 
Redistricting Committee to serve as a Democratic answer to Project RED-
MAP.294 Within a month after the 2018 elections, Democrats in New Jersey 
had already proposed a new state constitutional amendment to give the majori-
ty more control over the state redistricting committee and require the commit-
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tee to entrench the state majority.295 The intensity of partisan gerrymandering, 
now joined in full by the Democrats, will only increase in the coming years. 
IV. THE MISMATCHED LAW OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
The law of redistricting is mismatched to the new realities of hyperparti-
sanship that have emerged since the end of the Cold War era. As the normal 
hyperpartisanship has returned to American politics, so too has hyperpartisan 
gerrymandering. The law of redistricting, however, the foundations of which 
were set during the Cold War, reflects the bipartisan norms and politics of a 
previous age and its largely outdated assumptions about partisanship. Saddled 
by empirical understandings from the Cold War era, the Supreme Court re-
mains doubtful about the concreteness of representational harms from gerry-
mandering and underestimates the effectiveness, durability, and aggressiveness 
of today’s gerrymandering. Hyperpartisan gerrymandering, like hyperpartisan-
ship itself, is likely to be a permanent condition of American democracy, and 
the law of redistricting simply lags behind this present reality.  
A. The Law of Partisan Gerrymandering 
The law of partisan gerrymandering, like the rest of election law, began 
during the Cold War before hyperpartisanship re-emerged. The Court in Davis 
v. Bandemer first announced the justiciability of an equal protection challenge 
to partisan gerrymandering toward the end of the Cold War in 1986, but it did 
so by a splintered decision, which articulated an exceedingly difficult standard 
that no plaintiff met for almost two decades.296 On its face, the Bandemer 
standard required the plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination against an 
identifiable political group, such as a political party, and establish actual dis-
criminatory effect on that group that consistently degrades the groups’ influ-
ence on the political process.297 As applied by lower courts, the standard effec-
tively required that the plaintiff minority party be shut out of the political pro-
cess as a whole on a persistent basis.298 Bandemer therefore reflected the pre-
vailing assumptions about partisanship and voting from the Cold War. Gerry-
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mandering, as Justice O’Connor argued in her concurrence, was a “self-
limiting enterprise” because “voters can—and often do—move from one party 
to the other or support candidates from both parties.”299 Fluid partisanship of 
this sort ensured that gerrymanders could not deliver a reliable or lasting ad-
vantage that ought to concern courts, at least absent exceptional circumstances 
that lower courts never managed to find. 
When the Supreme Court scheduled Vieth v. Jubelirer for oral argument 
almost two decades after Bandemer, the Court appeared ready either to declare 
gerrymandering claims to be non-justiciable or announce a more attainable 
standard for such claims.300 In a fractured decision, however, the Court did 
nothing to clarify the law in either direction. Announcing the Court’s judgment 
and writing for four justices, Justice Scalia dismissed the plaintiffs’ equal pro-
tection challenge to Pennsylvania’s congressional redistricting and argued 
against justiciability under any standard. For Justice Scalia, some level of parti-
sanship was constitutionally permissible and practically unavoidable as “a lawful 
and common practice.”301 As a result, Justice Scalia argued that “[t]he central 
problem is determining when political gerrymandering has gone too far.”302 The 
fact that the majority enjoys a significant advantage is insufficient because it is 
“assuredly not true” that partisanship is the “only factor determining voting be-
havior at all levels.”303 Devising a standard to answer “the original unanswerable 
question (How much political motivation and effect is too much?)” was, for Jus-
tice Scalia, judicially unmanageable and therefore nonjusticiable.304 
Justice Scalia notwithstanding, it was Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, the 
opinion in support of the Court’s judgment on the narrowest grounds, that de-
cided the reasoning of Vieth. Justice Kennedy refused to overrule Bandemer 
and joined the four dissenters in favor of continuing the “possibility of judicial 
relief” for partisan gerrymandering claims.305 That said, Justice Kennedy re-
fused to join the four dissenters in selecting a standard for judging the constitu-
tionality of partisan gerrymanders and also declined to articulate one of his 
own.306 Like Justice Scalia, however, Justice Kennedy appeared skeptical 
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about the effectiveness of modern gerrymandering and any constitutional 
threat to political representation. Justice Kennedy remained uncertain about 
how well courts could identify “the precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders 
impose on the representational rights of voters and parties.”307 For Justice 
Kennedy, the Pennsylvania gerrymander was not sufficiently extreme to vio-
late the Constitution, but he hoped that social and computer scientists could 
develop “clear, manageable, and politically neutral standards” for courts to 
apply in future gerrymandering cases.308 Again, though, the murky law lower 
courts were left to decipher after Vieth did nothing to slow down the accelerat-
ing pace of gerrymandering.309 A dozen years passed during which courts con-
sistently dismissed partisan gerrymandering challenges, including cases in at 
least eight states following the 2011 redistricting cycle.310 
Until Whitford v. Gill. The Wisconsin gerrymander challenged in Whitford 
was representative of modern hyperpartisan gerrymandering. Partisan control 
of the state government toggled back and forth during the late 2000s. Demo-
crats temporarily won unified control of the state legislature in 2008, but Re-
publicans won it back in 2010 and then set out to create a district map that 
would, as the district court found it, “entrench[] the Republicans’ control of the 
Assembly.”311 They successfully did so, producing a map rated as one of the 
most biased partisan gerrymanders in the country since the one person, one 
vote decisions.312 The mapmakers offered the Republican leadership at least 
six alternative maps that ranged from “basic” to “assertive” to “aggressive” in 
terms of the partisan advantage it provided Republicans. The leadership tink-
ered with the most aggressive option until it achieved the maximal partisan 
advantage. Republicans anticipated that the enacted map would maintain a Re-
publican majority under any likely electoral outcome.313 Keith Gaddie, the Re-
publicans’ redistricting consultant, estimated that the Republicans needed only 
48% of the statewide vote to retain a firm majority of fifty-four out of ninety-
nine seats, while the Democrats would need more than 54% to win that many 
seats.314 
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In fact, the Whitford gerrymander performed even better than expected. In 
2012, Republicans gained only 48.6% of the two-party vote statewide, but still 
won sixty of ninety-nine seats in the assembly. The vote totals, within the 
range of realistic outcomes, did not seem to have a significant bearing on ma-
jority control. For example, when Republican candidates ran substantially bet-
ter in 2014 with 52% of the vote, they gained only three more assembly seats 
because the gerrymander had already secured almost every attainable seat re-
gardless of likely election outcome. Whether the Republicans won 48% of the 
vote or 52%, they held the legislative supermajority. In 2018, Democrats en-
joyed a boom election year, winning 54% of the aggregate vote in state assem-
bly races, and sweeping all four statewide offices up for election.315 Even so, 
Republicans successfully maintained their five-to-three congressional ad-
vantage, narrowly lost just one seat off their sixty-four-to-thirty-five assembly 
majority, and actually increased their eighteen-to-fifteen state senate majority 
by one seat.316 The effect of the Whitford gerrymander was not only robust but 
exceedingly durable, with a powerful bias on election outcomes seven years 
after the district map was redrawn. 
As a result, the Whitford plaintiffs challenged the gerrymander on equal 
protection grounds and won a district court trial—a breakthrough victory for 
partisan gerrymandering plaintiffs after years of failure in federal court.317 The 
plaintiffs argued that partisan intent and effect in their case were not only clear, 
but extreme. Wisconsin Republicans redistricted the state legislative map 
without any Democratic input or involvement and produced a map that guaran-
teed them a legislative supermajority almost regardless of realistic election 
outcome.318 Their social science evidence indicated that partisan advantage 
from the gerrymander, measured by any metric, ranked among the most severe 
in the country. What’s more, computer simulations showed that such severe 
partisan bias from redistricting would not have resulted from the government’s 
service of legitimate lawmaking interests; only extreme partisanship could ex-
plain how extremely favorable the Wisconsin map was for Republicans.319 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gill v. Whitford, vacated the district 
court’s verdict on standing grounds and remanded the equal protection 
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claims.320 In a brief opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that 
the plaintiffs’ claims that their party’s representation was diluted by the Repub-
lican gerrymander were more “conjectural or hypothetical,” than “actual or 
imminent,” for purposes of establishing injury in fact.321 This twist in the 
Court’s reasoning was largely unexpected and diverged from how the Court 
had previously handled gerrymandering claims as vote dilution problems.322 
Gill was anomalous in constitutional law in this sense, because the Court ad-
dressed standing without first addressing definitively whether there is first a 
constitutional injury under its new, shifted perspective on the claim.323 Argua-
bly, the Court’s muddled position on standing reflected “a skepticism of some 
members of the Court and a deep disagreement about the justiciability of the 
plaintiffs’ claim . . . .”324 
The foundation for the Court’s equivocation on gerrymandering claims 
was again rooted in a familiar Cold War skepticism about the power of parti-
sanship and the anticipated harms from gerrymandering. As Chief Justice Rob-
erts put it, federal courts need to play a “proper—and properly limited—role 
. . . in a democratic society” and therefore could intervene only when plaintiffs 
“prove concrete and particularized injuries using evidence . . . that would tend 
to demonstrate a burden on their individual votes.”325 Evidence that the plain-
tiffs’ party was injured by the gerrymander offered only “an average measure” 
that did not “address the effect that a gerrymander has on the votes of particu-
lar citizens.”326 The Court therefore refused to authorize further judicial inter-
vention against partisan gerrymandering, even as lower court rulings chafing at 
the Court’s resistance continued to pile up below.327 
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Just one term later, the Court finally declared political gerrymandering to 
be constitutionally nonjusticiable in Rucho v. Common Cause.328 There, the 
Court reviewed North Carolina’s gerrymander of its congressional districts that 
engineered a ten-to-three Republican advantage in the delegation despite a rea-
sonably even split of the two-party vote.329 The partisan purpose to create such 
Republican advantage in Rucho was particularly clear even by the gross stand-
ards of partisan gerrymandering. One of the Republican co-chairs of North 
Carolina legislature’s redistricting committee had boasted outright that his 
committee would make “all reasonable efforts” to maintain a ten-to-three parti-
san split of congressional districts and explained that the split would not be 
eleven-to-two only because the co-chair did “not believe it [would be] possible 
to draw a map with 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats.”330 What government 
interest could he offer in support of the gerrymander? The co-chair answered, 
“I think electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So I drew this 
map to help foster what I think is better for the country.”331 
Republican gerrymandering in North Carolina this decade, like its coun-
terpart in Wisconsin, performed exactly as hoped. With just 49% of the 
statewide vote in 2012, which was a relatively rough year for their party, Re-
publicans still managed to win nine of thirteen congressional seats.332 The total 
increased to ten of thirteen seats in 2014 when they won 55% of the vote.333 
The Rucho gerrymander was designed to lock in this advantage even after the 
state was legally required in 2015 to redraw its congressional districts for the 
2016 elections. And again, the Republicans won ten of thirteen seats in 2016 
with 53% of the statewide vote, and still held nine of thirteen seats in 2018 
despite winning just 50% of the vote in a down year for Republicans.334 The 
district court in Rucho struck down this gerrymander based on its obvious par-
tisan intent and effects. Its findings were bolstered by computer simulations 
that showed absent partisanship, redistricting of the state’s congressional lines 
led to at least one more Democratic seat in every one of 3,000 redistricting 
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simulations by one expert, and at least one more (and usually two or more) in 
over 99% of another expert’s 24,518 simulations.335 
But the Supreme Court reversed and finally dealt a fatal blow—for at 
least a generation—to the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims un-
der the federal Constitution. The Court declared non-justiciable the Rucho 
plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, as well as the plaintiffs’ First Amendment 
claims in a companion case out of Maryland, Lamone v. Benesek. Admitting 
that both gerrymanders were “highly partisan, by any measure,” Chief Justice 
Roberts’s majority opinion nonetheless parroted all of Justice Scalia’s reserva-
tions from Vieth, fifteen years earlier.336 Chief Justice Roberts again claimed 
the operative question was: “How to provid[e] a standard for deciding how 
much partisan dominance is too much?”337 To do so, courts would be required 
to “make their own political judgment about how much representation particu-
lar political parties deserve—based on the votes of their supporters.”338 Not 
only would this overstep the judiciary’s institutional role, as Chief Justice 
Roberts saw it, but it also demanded that courts wade into Justice Scalia’s “sea 
of imponderables.” 
Predictions of voting behavior, based in important part on partisanship, 
are the necessary foundation for effective gerrymandering. But when it came to 
courts engaging in the same type of analysis to assess the constitutionality of 
gerrymandering, Chief Justice Roberts shared Justice Scalia’s doubts from Vi-
eth and Justice O’Connor’s doubts from Bandemer, all many years earlier. He 
explained that “[v]oters elect individual candidates in individual districts, and 
their selections depend on the issues that matter to them, the quality of the 
candidates, the tone of the candidates’ campaigns, the performance of an in-
cumbent, national events or local issues that drive voter turnout, and other con-
siderations.”339 Chief Justice Roberts dismissed the weight of modern hy-
perpartisanship by echoing the outdated conventional wisdom of Cold War 
party politics. As he saw it, “Many voters split their tickets. Others never regis-
ter with a political party, and vote for candidates from both major parties at 
different points during their lifetimes.”340 
Never mind the growing sophistication of partisan gerrymandering and of 
expert capacity for measuring a gerrymander’s effectiveness and durability, the 
Chief Justice instead concluded that “asking judges to predict how a particular 
districting map will perform in future elections risks basing constitutional 
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holdings on unstable ground outside judicial expertise.”341 Justice Scalia could 
not have put it better, unless he already had in Vieth fifteen years earlier in 
2004. Apparently, in the majority’s view, nothing much relevant had changed 
since then in American politics. 
B. The Cold War Baseline: Mismatched Understandings  
About Partisanship and Gerrymandering 
The Court’s political gerrymandering decisions reflect Cold War compla-
cency about partisanship that no longer tracks today’s politics. The Court re-
sists judicial intervention into what it sees as an inherently political and messy 
process of redistricting, but this resistance is rooted in a broad skepticism 
about how well partisanship predicts voting such that concrete representational 
harms can be attributed to gerrymandering. The majority’s political priors, 
which underpin this resistance to judicial intervention, all date from an earlier 
era when neither partisanship nor gerrymandering were as intense and persis-
tent as today’s versions. These foundational assumptions no longer reflect the 
basic empirical reality. 
First, the inherited law of political gerrymandering assumes that partisan-
ship is far more fluid, and voting less predictable, than they are today. Of 
course, Justice O’Connor argued in Bandemer that voters change partisanship 
and vote for different parties from election to election, but even two decades 
later, Justice Scalia in Vieth complained about the unpredictable fluidity of par-
tisan affiliation. Partisan loyalty, he claimed, “may shift from one election to 
the next; and even within a given election, not all voters follow the party 
line.”342 Along these lines, a federal circuit court noted that a losing candidate 
“need only wait one term to put together a different coalition if the elected rep-
resentative proves to be unresponsive to any group of constituents.”343 As a 
consequence, Justice Scalia asserted that prediction of partisan outcomes re-
quired “a sea of imponderables” and “determinations that not even election 
experts can agree upon.”344 One district court, dismissing gerrymandering 
claims against a congressional plan as “highly impractical,” likewise agreed 
that “[v]oting statistics for past elections . . . can be grossly unreliable when 
used for prognostication.”345 In Gill, decided in 2018, the Court still rejected 
overwhelming evidence about the partisan effects of the Wisconsin gerryman-
der as “conjectural or hypothetical,” insufficient to provide injury in fact and 
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standing for the plaintiffs in the case.346 And of course, in Rucho, the Court 
still believed, quoting Bandemer, that “prognostications as to the outcome of 
future elections . . . invites findings on matters as to which neither judges nor 
anyone else can have any confidence.”347 The Court in Rucho explained that 
ticket splitting and party switching, among other considerations, made reliance 
on partisanship to predict voting “unstable ground” for constitutional law.348 
But if it were true that partisanship was fluid and unpredictable during the 
Cold War, it is quite less true today. Admittedly, voters were less predictable 
during the bipartisan Cold War, as they more frequently split their ticket or 
otherwise voted against their party identification depending on the candidate. 
That said, voters today are far more likely to display consistent voting patterns 
in favor of one party over the other than voters did during the Cold War.349 As I 
have detailed, modern voters are quite unlikely to split their ticket or switch 
parties between elections. Like nineteenth-century voters, today’s voters tend 
overwhelmingly to be consistent and loyal partisans from election to election. 
In fact, it is this predictability among today’s voters that makes it easier and 
safer to gerrymander aggressively with certainty about how a redistricting map 
will perform. As the redistricting consultant for North Carolina’s 2011 and 
2016 gerrymanders testified, “the underlying political nature of the precincts in 
the state does not change no matter what race you use to analyze it” and as a 
result, “once a precinct is found to be a strong Democratic precinct, it’s proba-
bly going to act as a strong Democratic precinct in every subsequent elec-
tion.”350 And what’s true for North Carolina is truer everywhere else than it has 
been in more than a century. Indeed, even political scientist Ronald Gaddie, 
himself a co-creator of the Whitford gerrymander in Wisconsin, agreed that 
voters’ predictable partisanship makes it “relatively straightforward for compe-
tent experts to provide their assessments” of how a gerrymander will per-
form.351 Indeed, he urged the Court to intervene against partisan gerrymanders 
like his own handiwork in Wisconsin.352 The Court’s skepticism about the pre-
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dictability of voters is not shared by the engineers of these gerrymanders who 
exploit it to unprecedented effectiveness. 
Second, because voters are more predictably partisan than they were dur-
ing the Cold War, gerrymandering is far more effective today than it was then. 
Modern hyperpartisanship means that voters too are more identifiably distinct 
and predictable based on their partisanship.353 In Bandemer itself, though, Jus-
tice O’Connor argued that partisan gerrymanders had limited effect because 
they were inherently a “self-limiting enterprise.”354 Self-limiting in the sense 
that an aggressive gerrymander exposes “its own incumbents to greater risks of 
defeat.”355 Citing Bandemer’s warning that an “overambitious gerrymander 
can lead to disaster for the legislative majority,” a district court concurred that 
the minority should “take solace in the fact that even the best laid plans often 
go astray” in redistricting.356 As a consequence, courts have comfortably con-
cluded that they need not be “in business to compensate for political errors, 
misfortunes or strokes of fate, which may leave political parties at some tem-
porary disadvantage.”357 
This argument once resonated in an earlier age when partisanship and par-
tisan voting was less predictable; I myself sympathized with a similar claim 
not so long ago.358 But any past tradeoff between electoral security and legisla-
tive seats in gerrymandering appears to be far less today than even a decade 
ago. As we have seen in Wisconsin, North Carolina, and other states, gerry-
manders today are far more durable and lasting in their partisan bias than they 
once were. Still, the Supreme Court majority has yet to acknowledge any need 
to revisit its empirical assumptions over the course of its gerrymandering deci-
sions, even as lower courts continue to shift in favor of plaintiffs below.359 In 
Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts actually persisted in citing the chief example of 
the Indiana gerrymander in Bandemer, from three decades prior, to illustrate 
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his point that gerrymanders are inherently unstable and can backfire when the 
partisan tides reverse.360 
In fact, the durability of the Whitford gerrymander, Gaddie’s own work, 
testifies to the advances in gerrymandering. Four election cycles later, Wiscon-
sin Democrats have been unable to dent the Whitford gerrymander despite 
winning decisively at the statewide level in 2018.361 The Whitford plaintiffs, in 
fact, rested their constitutional case on their social-scientific showing that the 
gerrymander’s efficiency gap of 10% to 13% was among the highest ever by 
historical comparison and likely to “exhibit a large and durable advantage in 
favor of Republicans over the rest of the decade.”362 Democrats were similarly 
thwarted in other states with highly effective Republican gerrymanders, includ-
ing North Carolina and Ohio.363 No longer, if ever, is gerrymandering a “self-
limiting” enterprise whose effects could backfire as the decade progresses.364 
Again, the majority’s political assumptions, developed during the Cold War 
experience, no longer held true. 
Third, the inherited law of partisan gerrymandering assumes that gerry-
mandering requires the majority party to moderate itself as the price of win-
ning more seats. In Vieth, Justice Scalia explicitly foregrounded this tradeoff as 
a check on the majority party’s aggressiveness. He explained that gerryman-
dering requires the majority to assume greater electoral risk by spreading its 
voters more thinly and thus creating more competitive districts in which the 
majority would be more vulnerable. Justice Scalia assumed that more competi-
tive districts also would be more centrist and therefore prone to elect more 
moderate candidates, whether Democrats or Republicans. On this point, he 
complained that the Equal Protection Clause did not take sides on whether 
Democrats should have “10 wishy-washy Democrats . . . or 5 hardcore Demo-
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crats.”365 That is, Justice Scalia reasoned that aggressive gerrymandering nec-
essarily requires dilution of a party’s ideological purity as the offset price of 
doing business. 
Again, if that were true in 2004, it appears much less true today. There is 
little empirical evidence suggesting that district composition today influences 
ideological polarization, all while gerrymandering has become more aggres-
sive and common.366 Whether a district is competitive or safe seems to have 
virtually no impact on legislator ideology because there are almost no “wishy-
washy” Democrats or Republicans elected to Congress today—regardless of 
district competitiveness. What matters ideologically is whether a Democrat or 
a Republican represents the district and whether a Democratic or Republican 
majority controls the legislature.367 The complete disappearance of ideological 
overlap between Republicans and Democrats in Congress and the widening 
ideological distance between the parties, coinciding with the worsening inten-
sity of gerrymandering, testifies to the obsolescence of these assumptions 
about redistricting politics. 
Courts occasionally even claim that independent voters in the partisan 
middle should be responsible for policing aggressive partisan gerrymandering 
by one side or the other. One district court, dismissing a gerrymandering claim, 
argued that gerrymandering must be “dealt with not by this court, but by the 
electorate, however their hearts and minds lead them.”368 By this logic, inde-
pendent voters in the political middle—offended that “those in power are cor-
rupting the free political process through anti-democratic . . . practices”—
should punish the majority for its overreach.369 According to this court, “it is 
up to an offended and affronted electorate to make things right.”370 But in to-
day’s politics, there are fewer and fewer independent voters in the middle to 
dole out such punishment to the majority party. Instead, even independent vot-
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ers display consistent partisan loyalties and vote according to those leanings, 
which makes them nearly as predictable as partisan voters.371 
Indeed, political stigma from one’s own party, imagined by courts, for 
playing hardball and gerrymandering the other side has evaporated. Partisan 
animus has increased sharply with hyperpartisanship. Partisans on both sides 
actively dislike and distrust their opponents more than they have since pollsters 
have measured such sentiment. Fifty years ago, about 5% of partisans reported 
that they would be displeased if their child married someone from the oppos-
ing party. Today, half of Republicans and a third of Democrats say they would 
be displeased.372 Forty-two percent of partisans say they view the opposition as 
“downright evil,” and almost 20% of partisans agree “that the country would 
be better off if large numbers of opposing partisans in the public today ‘just 
died.’”373 
Consistent with this animus for the opposite party, legislators have be-
come startlingly brazen in their open admissions of partisan intent to gerry-
mander. For example as noted above, the state redistricting chair, in Rucho, 
declared in a public session that the redistricting would be a political gerry-
mander because “electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats.”374 
All these hyperpartisan pressures mean that there are only increasing political 
incentives to gerrymander the other side, with few remaining political checks 
on the practice.375 Partisan voters may be as likely to root for redistricting ad-
vantages that boost their side as they would be to decry them for their anti-
democratic results.376 
Fourth, for all these reasons, the national frequency and magnitude of ger-
rymandering has expanded far beyond what the Court must have imagined 
when it began considering these cases during the Cold War. Today, not only is 
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the majority party better at maximizing partisan advantage through redistrict-
ing, it is also much more likely to gerrymander in the first place. An important 
study of gerrymandering in the 1980s found not only that partisan bias from 
gerrymandering during that era was modest by today’s standards, but also that 
the net national effect was barely distinguishable from zero.377 However, since 
then, the number of severe gerrymanders at the state legislative level, whether 
measured by efficiency gap or partisan bias, has more than doubled.378 Basical-
ly the same is true for congressional redistricting, as well.379 
Partisan gerrymandering has not been this pervasive and widespread in 
more than a century. Modern gerrymandering today has spread to more states, 
with a stronger partisan bias on average per state. In addition, the net national 
level of bias in Congress is now greater than that of the average state-level ger-
rymander during the 1980s.380 In other words, Congress as a whole is today 
more biased by Republican gerrymandering in favor of Republicans than the 
average state legislature gerrymandered under unified party control was biased 
in the majority party’s favor during the 1980s. 
Gerrymandering is not only worse today in scope and intensity, but it also 
results in a national partisan skew that did not exist in the 1980s when 
Bandemer was decided. At both the state legislative and congressional levels, 
the average district plan in the current cycle is more skewed than at any point 
since 1972.381 The 2012 election, in particular, saw the largest partisan tilts in 
modern history.382 At both electoral levels, the correlation between a map’s 
initial skew and its subsequent tilt over time has never been stronger.383 For 
example, this correlation is now above 0.8 for congressional plans, nearly a 
one-to-one correlation that is eight times higher than it was in the 1980s.384 
The point is not that courts should care whether Republicans, as opposed to 
Democrats, benefit from gerrymandering. They should not. My point instead is 
that the partisan advantage that has emerged makes it much harder to dismiss 
gerrymandering today as inconsequential when it potentially determines parti-
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san control of Congress between two fiercely opposed and highly competitive 
national parties.385 
The modern acceleration of gerrymandering is not surprising because the 
policy incentives to gerrymander under hyperpartisan competition are so much 
greater today than during the Cold War. From 1931 to 1994, Democrats con-
trolled the House of Representatives for thirty of thirty-two Congresses, a pe-
riod which spanned the entire Cold War era. However, since the end of that 
stretch, control of the House has flipped four times in twenty-five years. What 
is more, the sense that congressional control was up for grabs has increased 
dramatically during the modern era; there was virtually no belief that Republi-
cans, once regarded as a permanent minority, could seize the majority from the 
Democrats during the Cold War.386 Today, all that has changed, with neither 
party ever securely in the majority, and each perpetually protective of narrower 
majorities than those the Democrats enjoyed during the Cold War. As a result, 
both parties have far stronger incentives to strive for extra seats through ag-
gressive gerrymandering, just as they did a century ago. Control of Congress, 
for instance, is constantly on the line in a way that had never been true during 
the Cold War era, but marks a return to the earlier run of American history. The 
same is largely true for the battles over state legislative control.387 
Not only are the prospects for swinging majority control greater today, the 
policy payoffs from doing so are also much greater than they were during the 
Cold War. As I have explained, the average ideological distance between Re-
publicans and Democrats has increased dramatically since the Cold War.388 As 
a result, the anticipated policy swing from one party to the other, or vice versa, 
even for control of a single seat, let alone the legislative majority, is far more 
meaningful than it once was. Given the diminishing policy overlap between 
the parties, bipartisan compromises with the legislative minority are far less 
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likely today,389 and minority parties are more likely to obstruct the majority 
and block potential legislative victories in hopes of winning the next election 
and the legislative majority for itself.390 Even nonideological issues such as 
disaster relief and pandemic response appear driven by partisanship.391 
Finally, gerrymandering has become more effective, in part because redis-
tricting technology and data has improved so much since the courts began de-
ciding partisan gerrymandering cases during the Cold War. Although the in-
tense pressure to gerrymander is not entirely new to American politics, today’s 
hyperpartisanship can now be married to new redistricting computer technolo-
gy—and even supercomputing technology—that would have boggled the 
minds of nineteenth-century politicians. Even as recently as the 1980s, map 
drawers worked with pen, paper, and precinct-level aggregate data that limited 
the effectiveness of their handiwork. Their modern counterparts have super-
computing power for simulations, individual-level data on voters and house-
holds, and redistricting software so easy to use that schoolchildren literally can 
use it to draw their own maps.392 Speaking from direct experience, Professors 
Bernard Grofman and Ronald Gaddie warned in their amicus brief in Gill, 
“With vastly improved computer speed, memory, and storage, map drawers 
can design district lines so precisely that they simultaneously maximize their 
party’s gains and eliminate most competitive districts—ensuring . . . an elec-
toral advantage that endures throughout the following decade.”393 Simply put, 
new computer capability has coincided with the re-emergence of hyperparti-
sanship to produce gerrymanders of unimaginable effectiveness. As Justice 
Kagan warned in her Rucho dissent, “These are not your grandfather’s—let 
alone the Framers’—gerrymanders.”394 
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Ironically, Justice Kennedy anticipated the impact of technological ad-
vances on redistricting in his Vieth opinion. There, he pointed to the potential 
of new technology for future solutions. He acknowledged the “rapid evolution 
of technologies in the apportionment field” and that “[c]omputer assisted dis-
tricting ha[d] become so routine and sophisticated that legislatures, experts, 
and courts [could] use databases to map electoral districts in a matter of hours, 
not months.”395 He thus viewed technology as “both a threat and a promise.”396 
He foresaw how technology could exacerbate the partisan bias from gerry-
mandering and make the practice easier and more pervasive, just as it has be-
come. Nonetheless, he also foresaw that new technology could “produce new 
methods of analysis that make more evident the precise nature of the burdens 
gerrymanders impose on the representational rights of voters and parties.”397 It 
therefore could “facilitate court efforts” by providing judicially manageable 
standards for judging the representational burdens inflicted by a challenged 
gerrymander.398 
Indeed, Justice Kennedy was right on both predictions. As I have ex-
plained, computer technology and better data have made gerrymanders more 
effective and durable in the decade and a half since Vieth. Computer technolo-
gy and better data have also advanced the ability of political scientists and stat-
isticians to quantify the representational burdens imposed by partisan gerry-
manders in a historical context.399 Gill and Rucho, in fact, featured a series of 
amicus briefs from academics all agreeing with Professor Gaddie that “statisti-
cal tools for detecting and measuring partisan gerrymanders [had] improved 
greatly” over the past decade.400 Not only have statistical metrics for measur-
ing the severity of gerrymandering advanced since Vieth, but a whole new field 
of supercomputing simulations have developed for testing the partisan effect of 
gerrymanders.401 Supercomputers can use traditional redistricting criteria to 
generate thousands of redistricting plans by algorithm and thereby demonstrate 
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for litigation purposes the exceptionality and egregiousness of the partisan bias 
produced by actual gerrymanders. Such simulation data were cited extensively 
in litigation over gerrymanders in Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
and Wisconsin.402 Whitford and Rucho were virtual referenda on the new field 
of gerrymandering science. 
The Court, by refusing to accept any of the many new social science 
methods for measuring partisan effect, disabled only one side of the arms race 
between redistricters and their watchdogs. Now, after Rucho, the Court has 
withdrawn entirely from the field despite the abundance of sophisticated social 
science methods for measuring and policing partisan bias403—which Justice 
Roberts dismissed as “sociological gobbledygook.”404 Even as gerrymandering 
becomes more sophisticated and powerful in the 2020s, lower courts will be 
sidelined by the Supreme Court’s outdated understandings and refusal to inter-
vene. Meanwhile, all the hired guns who design today’s modern gerrymanders 
enjoy the full, increasing benefit of these technological advances and are able 
to draw more biased maps for the legislative majority. All this expertise makes 
gerrymandering worse, while Rucho permits no countervailing opportunity 
under the federal Constitution to apply this expertise on the side of regulation. 
Some of these outdated assumptions about partisanship are understanda-
ble for many of us. Almost any federal judge today came of age and has spent 
most of her adult life during the Cold War era before hyperpartisanship re-
turned. Indeed, for those of the Cold War generation, the era understandably 
influences our expectations and norms about partisanship and bipartisan coop-
eration.405 Bipartisanship remains powerfully attractive even in today’s poli-
tics, and gentlemanly figures from the Cold War are remembered fondly as 
“leader[s] of the old school who tried to work with others to get things done 
and disdained the kind of go-for-the-jugular politics so common today.”406 To-
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day’s inherited election law still reflects its earlier roots in this era and its un-
derstandings of partisanship, voting, and redistricting. 
However, these assumptions today are outmoded and underestimate the 
democratic challenges posed by modern hyperpartisan gerrymandering in al-
most every respect. Modern hyperpartisanship, and hyperpartisan gerryman-
dering, are a different breed of politics than what prevailed during the Cold 
War. Over the course of American history, it is the Cold War era that stands out 
as historically unusual in terms of the partisanship and redistricting. The earlier 
American history more resembles today’s hyperpartisanship than the Cold War 
bipartisanship that many fondly remember and pine for. Today’s hyperpartisan-
ship is not simply a function of certain bad actors or a temporary confluence of 
odd events.407 Hyperpartisanship and its attendant hyperpartisan gerrymander-
ing are likely to be permanent conditions of American politics, a reversion 
back to the historical norm, and require judicial adjustment to the law of parti-
san gerrymandering. Worse, continued judicial acquiescence to modern hy-
perpartisanship tacitly permits its greatest excesses to spread more widely and 
become more intense across not just election law, but all public law.408 
I have argued elsewhere how courts should confront modern gerryman-
dering.409 After Rucho, there is no justiciable federal constitutional claim any 
longer, and even state courts under state constitutional law may permit the 
government to gerrymander freely for partisan advantage unless its partisan 
effect “has gone too far.”410 Courts still often defer to the government on the 
discretionary matter of redistricting as “quintessentially a political process.”411 
I argue that, as a basic matter of constitutional law, the state must justify its 
redistricting decisions in terms of a legitimate government lawmaking interest. 
Partisan advantage for its own sake ought not to count as a legitimate govern-
ment interest, just as it does not in other areas of constitutional law.412 Correct-
ing the law to disallow the government from asserting bare partisanship as a 
basis for lawmaking would curb partisan gerrymandering under a clear, man-
ageable standard, without complicating judicial involvement in redistricting. 
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My purpose in this Article, however, is simply to expose the broken as-
sumptions underlying the existing law of partisan gerrymandering as it has 
evolved. Perhaps the Court’s expectation is that gerrymandering becomes less 
pervasive and less intense over time, as its gerrymandering decisions seem to 
suggest is inevitable. Nonetheless, the underlying conditions that drive modern 
hyperpartisan gerrymandering, namely today’s hyperpartisanship, are striking-
ly different from the American politics that many assume as a baseline expec-
tation about partisanship, and these conditions are exceptionally likely to per-
sist for the foreseeable future as the normal state of American politics. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts began and developed redistricting law during the Cold War, a pe-
riod when partisanship was exceptionally low by the historically standards of 
American history. The resulting blind spot in redistricting law deeply underes-
timates the magnitude, pervasiveness, and durability of modern gerrymander-
ing, which now has reverted back to its historical norm along with the usual 
hyperpartisanship that has characterized American politics before the Cold 
War. This Article exposes the roots of this blind spot and the courts’ stubborn 
resistance to addressing partisan gerrymandering in the modern age, culminat-
ing in Rucho. 
This story of the Cold War’s influence on law is not limited to redistrict-
ing law, or even election law. Most of modern American public law was like-
wise developed over the past eighty years. Virtually all administrative law, en-
vironmental law, much of free speech, media, and national security law, and 
certainly the rest of election law was decided over the same period of histori-
cally exceptional bipartisanship when the parties were comparatively at peace. 
The re-emergence of modern hyperpartisanship mismatches this inherited pub-
lic law with the political circumstances assumed at its origination and may re-
quire a similar reckoning across many areas of law within our entirely different 
hyperpartisan context.413 It is law that requires adjustment, if anything, because 
these politics are familiar to American history and likely here to stay. 
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